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INTRODUCTION 
Rapid and far-reaching changes in health-care delivery have 
reshaped the way the physician practices medicine. Often, the 
physician's legal and ethical obligations to provide care are in direct 
conflict with society's push to limit its cost. l On the one hand, the 
physician must adhere to the law and the medical profession's code 
of ethics, which generally dictate that the individual patient's needs 
should come first? On the other hand, unlike the passive third-party 
payer of the past, managed care organizations (MeOs) seek to control 
health care costs by controlling physicians' utilization and provision 
of health care services.3 The reality of a physician's participation 
* Dionne Koller Fine is Assistant Director for Academic Achievement and Lecturer, University of 
Maryland School of Law. B.A., cum laude, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D., with honors, 
George Washington University Law School; M.A., George Washington University. 
\. See generally Robert I. Field, New Ethical Relationships Under Health Care's New Structure: 
The Needfora New Paradigm, 43 VD..L. L REV. 467 (1998). 
2. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be Changed to 
Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L.REV. 1809, 183940 (1992). 
3. See BARRY R. FuRROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAw, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, vol. 1, chs. I-
11,289-90 (West Group 2d ed. 2000). 
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with a managed care plan is that she simply must ration care. 
The liability standards applied to physicians have largely remained 
unchanged despite the drastic change in the role of the third-party 
payer in the physician-patient relationship. Courts continue to rely on 
traditional formulations of physicians' duties in malpractice cases, 
and Congress and the states have focused on passing targeted 
legislation aimed at ensuring that MCOs' overriding interest in 
controlling costs does not subvert patient care.4 The physician is 
caught in the middle, and this catch-22 presents a significant policy 
problem. 
The specific policy problem grows out of this tension between the 
physician's legal and ethical obligations and the requirements 
imposed on the physician by managed health care. The problem 
manifests itself in two distinct ways. First, and most directly, the 
issue confronts the physician in the context of malpractice liability. 
Unlike the fee-for-service system, in which physicians enjoyed 
almost complete autonomy over patient care, MCOs now impose on 
physicians a significant amount of direct and indirect control over the 
way they practice medicine. This control often forces physicians to 
ration care. Although in many cases rationing at the bedside may 
result in eliminating arguably unnecessary health care, frequently it 
involves limiting care that may be beneficial and within the current 
standard of care. Such rationing subjects the physician to malpractice 
liability risks. Current medical malpractice law enhances this risk 
because the standard of care not only rejects the notion of rationing or 
cost-control as a defense, it also speaks frequently of the physician 
having a duty to resist being tainted by the pressures of managed 
health care and cost containment. 
The second manifestation of the policy problem grows out of the 
first and involves physicians' vulnerability in their relationship with a 
managed care plan. Physicians' contracts with third-party payers 
have a central role in the way they practice medicine. Such contracts 
commonly provide that physicians who do not control costs in 
4. Catherine M. Hedgeman, The Rationing of Medicine: Herdrich v. Pegram, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 305, 306-08 (2000). 
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accordance with an MeO's cost-containment policies face 
deselection or termination from the plan. Such an outcome could 
seriously injure or even destroy physician practices. 
This article examines these issues and potential solutions using a 
philosophical framework. Such an approach will demonstrate that 
significant ethical issues arise when physicians dispense managed 
health care within the current liability framework. The problems 
discussed here do not simply affect individual patients, but physicians 
and society at large. Such issues must not be ignored when 
policymakers craft health care reform initiatives. 
Part I of this article describes the traditional fee-for-service model 
of health-care delivery and the current managed care system. Part IT 
explains the legal framework in which physicians practice medicine. 
Part ill of this article asserts that the law's failure to account for the 
change to managed care and the resulting change in the way 
physicians practice medicine has created a situation that is 
fundamentally unfair to physicians. The law holds the physician to a 
fee-for-service level of care, which generally rejects considerations of 
costs, while physicians' obligations to MeOs often require that they 
ration care. MeOs, with their market power and ability to set the 
terms of contracts with participating physicians, are able to terminate 
physicians who do not sufficiently contain costs, often with little 
notice. This section argues that the continued adherence to outdated 
principles of liability is deficient from a utilitarian perspective. The 
current legal framework does not further society's overall goal of 
lowering health care costs. 
Finally, Part IV of this article discusses the possible solutions to 
this policy problem such as federal and state legislation that would 
impose greater liability on Meos and leave physicians' legal 
obligations in place. This section evaluates proposed solutions and 
identifies the ethical strengths and weaknesses of each. The article 
concludes that the superior solution is one that relies on the 
profession itself to mitigate the unfairness and address the utilitarian 
concerns posed by the policy problem. This solution draws on 
existing legal rules, which give great deference to the medical 
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profession to set its own standards in malpractice cases. The solution 
envisions a proactive role for the profession and suggests that such an 
approach is in fact morally required. 
II. THE FEE-FaR-SERVICE AND MANAGED CARE MODELS 
To understand the ethical implications of the physician's current 
role in delivering health care services, it is important to understand 
the fee-for-service and managed care models. Generally speaking, 
the fee-for-service model is based on principles of physician fidelity 
and patient autonomy. At its best, the model reflects the notion that 
every individual, at least every insured individual, is entitled to all 
medical care that could be beneficial, regardless of how much the 
care might cost. 5 Therefore, the physician's interest and patient's 
interest are aligned to provide as much health care as could possibly 
be of benefit. 
The managed care model does not focus on what is best for 
individual patients, but instead on what is best for society. As society 
cannot support dramatically escalating health care costs, the managed 
. care system draws its moral strength from its ability to control these 
costs and therefore ensure that health care remains affordable for the 
largest number of individuals. At its best, the model reflects the 
notion that much of the health care currently being delivered is 
wasteful and unnecessary. By weeding out the waste, the hope is that 
managed care will not only control costs, but also improve care. 
A. The Fee-for-Service Model 
The fee-for-service model is one where physicians are paid on a 
retrospective basis, and in full, for all "medically necessary" services 
provided to the patient.6 Traditionally, the physician alone 
determined what services were medically necessary. Therefore, 
"physician income is directly proportional to the billing generated by 
5. See MARK HAll.. MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAw, ETHICS, AND EcONOMICS 
OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
6. See Field. supra note I, at 468-69. 
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services rendered to patients.,,7 Third-party payers had no role in the 
physician-patient relationship.8 . As a result, no financial or other 
incentives in the model encourage physicians to limit care.9 
Significantly, critics noted that, because of the lack of any oversight 
over physicians, they had no incentive to consider the costs of the 
services they provided, and indeed, the system actually encouraged 
physicians to provide unnecessary or marginally beneficial care. JO 
The fee-for-service model did not incorporate the view that doctors 
needed to or should control health-care costs. 
1. Ethical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Fee-for-Service Model 
The fee-for-service model is based on the ethical duty of absolute 
fidelity to the patient, which requires physicians to work in the 
interests of their patients first and foremost, even over their own 
personal interest. ll Therefore, the physician's interests generally 
align with those of her patient. The fee-for-service system reinforced 
this ethic by "exclud[ing] outside influences from the doctor-patient 
relationship, enabling physicians to devote [their] full attention to 
patients.,,12 Accordingly, the fee-for-service system isolated the 
treatment relationship from the workings of the market. Only 
physicians were subject to financial incentives, and the incentive was 
not to withhold care. It was traditionally held that physicians could 
counter this inducement with ethics. 13 The model draws moral 
strength from the egalitarian principle that individuals are entitled to 
the best care, regardless of its cost. At its best, the fee-for-service 
model honors the dignity of individuals and value of all human life 
because cost is generally not a consideration in determining the care 
that should be delivered. 
7. Daniel P. Sulmasy. Physicians. Cost Control. and Ethics. in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED 
CARE 155. 166 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eels.) 1997). 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 469-70. 
II. See TROYEN BRENNAN. JUST DOCTORING: MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE UBERALSTATE 35 (Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1991). 
12. See BRENNAN. supra note II. at 32. 
13. See id. at 33. 
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However, the fee-for-service system is not without ethical 
weakness. The underlying assumption of the fee-for-service system 
is that "physicians are morally superior people.,,14 In fact, the power 
the physician has over the patient, the nature of greater knowledge, 
and the ability to dictate the terms and course of treatment, provide 
the possibility the physician will "exploit patients' vulnerability.,,15 
Therefore, the fee-for-service model can encourage over-treatment, 
which aside from its costs, holds significant physical risks~ 
[I]t is a well-documented fact that the sanctity of the ideal 
patient-physician relationship in fee-for-service arrangements 
has been overestimated. Under that model, financial conflicts of 
interest among medical professionals also existed. However, 
doctors could more easily hide financially motivated behavior 
since their interests were often aligned with those of their 
patients. 16 
Perhaps the chief weakness of the fee-for-service system is that it 
overlooks society's need to control health care costs and instead 
focuses on providing individual patients with all treatment that could 
possibly be beneficial. 17 Because resources that can be devoted to 
health care are finite, however, the fee-for-service system is self-
destructing. 18 Some scholars argue the ethically su'perior approach, 
therefore, is an approach that takes account of what is best for 
society, and therefore the greatest number of individuals. 19 
14. KENMAN WONG, MEDICINE AND THE MARKETPLACE 65 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998). 
Wong asserts that "the belief that. as a profession, physicians can be completely trusted as the exclusive 
guardians of the health of patients is one that should be held loosely." [d. 
15. E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW 
EcONOMICS 44 (Georgetown Univ. Press 1995). 
16. WONG, supra note 14, at 67. 
17. HALL, supra note 5, at 131. 
18. [d. at 131-32. 
19. See id. at 130-33. 
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C. The Managed Care Model 
Managed care attempts to control health care costs by controlling 
physician behavior and limiting patients' utilization of services 
through a variety of techniques.2o Therefore the term managed care 
"can be used to include virtually any financing arrangement where 
there is third-party management or supervision that attempts in some 
structured way to oversee quality and, particularly, the costs of 
services delivered to the plan's beneficiaries.,,21 Courts have noted 
that MCOs often wear two hats, providing administrative support for 
an insurance plan, including making determinations of eligibility or 
coverage, and acting "as an arranger and provider of medical 
treatment.,,22 Therefore, MCOs integrate financing and delivery of 
health care. Managed care encompasses many different types of 
health care delivery structures, including Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), 
and Independent Practice Associations (IPAs). The principles 
underlying the different managed care structures, however, are the 
same. 
MCOs use many techniques to force physicians and patients to 
consider the costs of care.23 For instance, MCOs often require pre-
authorization for certain services, restrict access to specialists, deny 
payment for services provided outside of their provider "network," 
and . restrict coverage for prescription drugs. Many MCOs pay 
physicians on a capitated basis, whereby physicians agree to receive a· 
fixed monthly fee per enrolled patient from the MCO, regardless of 
what services patients ultimately need and receive. 24 MCOs also 
frequently offer participating physicians bonus incentives tied to 
certain utilization levels.25 
One of an MCO's primary cost containment tools is utilization 
20. See John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1397, 1402, 1478 (1997). 
21. KENNETH R. WING, ET AL., THE LAw AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 84 (Aspen Law & Business 
1998). 
22. Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000). 
23. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 290, 404. 
24. See id. at 399-400. 
25. See id. at 400. 
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review, which "is designed to evaluate the medical necessity and 
appropriateness of health services from the payer's perspective, in 
light of norms of acceptable practice.,,26 Utilization review is "based 
on two assumptions': that there are wide variations in the use of many 
. medical services; and that careful review of medical care can 
eliminate wasteful, unnecessary care or harmful care.,,27 It mainly 
consists of prior review, before services are delivered, and concurrent 
review and case management. 28 Prior review includes "pre-
admission review" before hospitalization for elective procedures, 
"admission review" for emergency admissions, review during 
hospital admission to determine the length of stay, and "pre-
procedure review" to determine the appropriateness of certain 
recommended procedures.29 In addition to these techniques for 
standard plan participants, MeOs have case managers who closely 
monitor treatment for high-cost plan members suffering from costly 
or chronic conditions.3o 
D. Ethical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Managed Care Model 
The managed care model purportedly recognizes that society's 
health care resources are scarce.31 It is not self-destructing, as the 
fee-for-service model is said to be, but will in fact sustain the level of 
quality health care with which we are accustomed while promoting 
the societal goal of reducing costs.32 The concern for costs, in this 
view, gives managed care an ethical edge over fee-for-service 
medicine in that it does not consider individuals at the expense of 
society. 33 Society benefits because more individuals will be able to 
obtain care. 
The primary ethical objection to managed care is that the cost-
26. [d. at 414. 
27. [d. 
28. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 415. 
29. [d. at 45. 
30. [d. 
31. See Nonnan Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States [s So Hard,.in CHOICES 
AND CONFLICT: EXPLORA nONS IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS 57 (Emily Friedman ed., 1992). 
32. See HALL, supra note 5, at 132. 
33. See id. 
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containment strategies that MCOs commonly employ alter the 
traditional physician-patient relationship.34 Critics assert that 
physicians can no longer exclusively act as the patient's advocate and 
consider the patient's needs without regard to considerations of 
COSt.
35 Because of the structure of many MCO-physician contracts, 
physicians' incomes are put in conflict with the well-being of their 
patients.36 Critics also assert that MCOs induce physicians to deny 
necessary treatment, unlike the fee-for-service model.37 Accordingly, 
MCOs force physician!; to ration care at the bedside, a role critics 
point out is unethical. 38 An additional ethical problem stems from 
the fact that MCOs are for-profit enterprises. "These institutions 
have conflicting roles in their attempt to function both as traditional 
businesses, which have financial obligations to shareholders, and as 
medical entities, which have duties to uphold the best interests of 
patients.,,39 The emphasis on the bottom line provides a strong 
incentive for such companies to enroll only healthy participants, who 
are likely to have lower health care costs, and avoid enrolling 
chronically ill or disabled individuals.4o Commentators refer to this 
incentive as "cream skimming," and it raises significant issues 
regarding health care coverage options for the most vulnerable 
members of society.41 Additionally, MCOs lack organizational ethics 
that would draw from work that has been done in corporate ethics.42 
As MCOs continue to grow, there must be some investigation and 
development of organizational ethics in light of the tension between 
the MCO's for-profit status and the patient-centered ethic of 
medicine:43 
34. See Field, supra note I, at 478. 
35. See id. at 478-79; Andrea K. Marsh, Sacrificing Patients for Profits: Physician Incentives to 
Limit Care and ERISA Fiduciary Duty, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1323-24 (1999). 
36. See Sulmasy, supra note 7, at 160-61. 
37. See Marsh, supra note 35, at 1324. 
38. See HALL, supra note 5, at 114. 
39. WONG, supra note 14, at I. 
40. Id. at 66. 
41. Id. at 66-67. 
42. Id. at 4. 
43. Id. at 5. 
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E. The Two Models and Health Care Rationing 
The two models of health care delivery outlined above ultimately 
diverge on the issue of health care rationing. The fee-for-service 
model explicitly rejects rationing as unethical.44 In contrast, the 
managed care model embraces certain rationing techniques and, in 
many cases, requires physicians to ration care.45 A policy problem 
emerges as the law, to a great extent, sanctions rationing by MeOs, 
but forbids it' by physicians. "Despite consensus among most experts 
that health care costs must be contained, great controversy surrounds 
whether it is ever acceptable to ration health care.'.46 
F. Rationing and Patients 
A popular misconception about health care is that more care is 
better than less.47 Some scholars note that the demand for health care 
is "virtually unlimited. ,.48 A related belief, sometimes referred to by 
scholars as our "medical egalitarianism," is that society is unwilling 
to accept that some people are not entitled to at least a minimum level 
of health care due to their inability to pay.49 
[W]e are libertarians to the extent that we leave individuals free 
for the most part to engage in highly risky behavior, but our 
humanitarian and egalitarian values come to the forefront when 
we observe people who are actively suffering from whatever 
causes, including their own improvidence . . . . This strong 
rescue ethic . . . means that our society will care for people in 
serious and obvious distress regardless of whether they can 
44. See Field, supra note 1, at 469. 
45. See id. at 473. 
46. PETER USEL, PRICING LIFE: WHY IT'S TIME FOR HEALTH CARE RATIONING 11 (MIT Press 
2(00). 
47. WILLIAM I. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 9 (5th ed. 1998). 
48. [d. at Ill. 
49. PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE 116-17 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1990). 
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pay.50 
These beliefs no doubt underlie the backlash against managed care. 
Although individuals want to control health care costs, they do not 
want to sacrifice the type or amount of care they can access. The law 
has not accepted such sacrifices either. 
G. Rationing and Physicians 
Patients' reluctance to cut back when it comes to their own care is 
likely a learned response to years of fee-for-service medicine and the 
fee-for-service ethic of the medical profession. The medical 
profession has long held that the physician's individual patient must 
always come first, and considerations of cost should never be part of 
the treatment relationship.51 Physicians have an "ethic of absolute 
quality;" in the physician's view, "literally any marginal medical 
benefit, no matter how small, is worth absolutely any price because 
we want doctors in their role as healers to behave as if each of our 
lives is priceless.,,52 Therefore, most physicians and other experts are 
opposed to care rationing because it violates commonly understood 
physician duties to their patients and therefore erodes the trust that is 
the foundation of the physician-patient relationship.53 Moreover, 
physicians often assert that they are simply not trained to ration care, 
which creates the possibility that they will not ration fairly. 54 
Physicians find rationing difficult because "providers cannot 
appeal to the justice of their denial;,,55 in other words, there is no 
clear connection between the resources saved when health care is 
limited for one patient and resources spent on others. 56 Physicians 
have no guarantee that their bedside rationing will result in better 
health care, only that, in general, they are helping to reduce the 
50. HALL, supra note 5, at 32. 
51. See BRENNAN, supra note 11, at 48. 
52. HALL, supra note 5, at 115. 
53. See USEL, supra note 46, at 109. 
54. See USEL, supra note 46, at 109. 
55. Daniels, supra note 31, at 59. 
56. [d. 
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pressure of growing health care costS.57 Therefore, physicians have 
no greater ethic to follow than their own professional ethic, which 
mandates that the patient always comes first.58 Ethical beliefs and 
professional norms often lead physicians to avoid rationing imposed 
by MeOs at all costs. Indeed, citing their ethic of fidelity to their 
patients, a large number of physicians have indicated that they have 
or would submit inaccurate billing statements to insurers in an 
attempt to secure for their patients what they believe to be necessary 
medical care. 59 
Despite this seemingly categorical opposition to care rationing, 
bedside rationing in fact is part of many physician-patient 
relationships, although physicians likely will not admit it.6o "[I]n the 
current health care environment, most clinicians have been taught 
that [rationing] is immoral. Thus, they rely on euphemisms 
without having to acknowledge that they are rationing.,,61 
H. Rationing, the Law, and Managed Care 
From a legal perspective, not all health care rationing is 
impermissible. For the most part, the law does not prevent the type 
of implicit rationing by the free market that regularly occurs in our 
society. Although federal law does require emergency departments to 
initially screen and stabilize all patients who present themselves for 
treatment,62 nothing in the law requires physicians to accept patients 
who cannot pay.63 The law also permits the explicit rationing 
involved in coverage determinations, such as scrutinizing requested 
services to make sure they fall within the scope of covered 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 89. 
59. Victor G. Freeman, Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 159 ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 2263, 2263 (1999). 
60. USEL, supra note 46, at 137. 
61. Id. Ubel states that bedside rationing is "ubiquitous." Id. He gives the example of an 
orthopedic surgeon repairing an elderly individual's hip. Id. Ubel notes that the surgeon will choose a 
less expensive and lower-quality hardware for the procedure based on the patient's life expectancy. [d. 
at 111. 
62. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1395dd (2001). 
63. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1840. 
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circumstances.64 The law draws the line on rationing, however, when 
"it affects the recommendations for care made by the physician.,,65 
Therefore, under current malpractice law, physicians cannot make 
treatment recommendations that deny patients beneficial care. There 
is "unanimity' between ethical and legal communities in their 
opposition to bedside rationing.,,66 As mentioned above, rationing is 
central to managed health care, and has been accepted on some level 
as necessary to control health care costs. Much of the recent law 
involving managed care reflects the conflict over whether rationing is 
necessary or acceptable.67 In cases involving MCOs, courts uphold 
the utilization review and incentive structures that are key to 
controlling physician behavior, which effectively require physicians 
to ration care.68 Cases against physicians, however, do not openly 
embrace these principles. 
This article assumes that some form of health care rationing is 
necessary and even inevitable.69 It also assumes that managed care 
adopts a system of implicit rationing, whereby physicians cut back on 
the treatment they provide at the bedside. As discussed below, the 
law should sanction implicit rationing as part of a policy solution to 
mitigate the unfairness to physicians currently caught in the middle of 
managed care's drive for cost-containment, as well as to better 
promote society's goals of reducing overall health care costs. 
n. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THE PHYSICIAN PRACTICES 
MEDICINE 
To evaluate whether the current liability framework affecting 
physicians is fair (and justified from a utilitarian perspective), it is 
important to keep in mind key areas of the law that have an impact on 
the physician. This discussion of the legal framework is intended as a 
brief review and only presents the issues to the extent they are 
64. See Pegram v. Herdrich. 530 U.S. 211. 219 (2000). 
65. See Hirshfe1d. supra note 2. at 1841. 
66. HALL. supra note 5. at 117. 
67. See. e.g .• Pegram. 530 U.S. at 22'1. 
68. See. e.g .• id. at 219. 
69. See generally HALL. supra note 5: 
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relevant to evaluating the policy problem and potential solutions. 
A. Medical Ethics 
Although principles of medical ethics do not have the force of law, 
the physician's ethical framework is important because the law 
reflects these ethics and they are indeed the backbone of many of the 
physician's legal obligations.7o The concept of medical ethics began 
with the Hippocratic Oath. Medical ethics then grew out of "[t]he 
variety of codes, essays by physicians, theologians,· and 
philosophers," whose writings had a common thread-physicians' 
responsibility to their patients.71 Therefore, "a physician is said to act 
morally when he or she places the patient's welfare above all other 
considerations.,,72 Medical ethics continuously evolved until 1912, 
around which time "the emphasis on patient trust, doctor control, and 
economic noninterference was institutionalized.'.73 These ethical 
principles are demonstrated by the method with which health 
insurance traditionally was structured, as well as in physicians' legal 
obligations to their patients.74 "[T]he [c]ommitment to the patient is . 
. . nourished by a wealth of themes and images deeply embedded in 
medical culture.,,75 Indeed, these images are also embedded in the 
legal culture that developed around modem medicine. 
B. Fiduciary Duties 
Legally, physicians have a fiduciary relationship with their 
patients.76 The patient, who is in a vulnerable state, places his trust 
and confidence in the physician who, due to her training and 
experience, has vastly superior knowledge of the patient's condition 
70. See generally BRENNAN. supra note 11. 
71. [d. at 33. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 32. 
74. See generally id. at 44-45. 
75. See MENZEL. supra note 49. at 4. 
76. In this relationship. "trust and confidence are reposed by one party in the influence or 
dominance of another. creating in the latter a duty to act with greater diligence and care than that 
required by a common negligence standard of due care." See MORREIM. supra note 15. at 44; Neade v. 
Portes. 739 N.E.2d 496. 500 (TIl. 2000). 
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and options for care.77 This relationship requires fidelity, and as 
such, physicians "must be dedicated to serving their patients' 
interests, even above their own.,,78 Therefore, in imposing fiduciary 
duties on physicians, the legal system incorporates the medical 
profession's own standard of placing the patient first. 
From the fiduciary nature of the relationship, the law derives 
several duties that it imposes on physicians, including the duty to 
maintain confidentiality, avoid conflicts of interest, and secure 
informed consent from the patient.79 The law that has developed in 
the area of informed consent is a good example of the way in which 
the law defers to or incorporates the standards of the medical 
profession. In cases brought by patients alleging that the physician 
administered treatment without informed consent, the standard 
applied by the majority of states is whether the physician disclosed 
information that the reasonable, prudent physician would disclose to 
a patient under similar circumstances.8o This view rejects the other 
standard, applied by' a handful' of jurisdictions, requiring the 
physician to disclose what, in the physician's view, the reasonable 
patient would need to know to make an informed decision as to 
whether to proceed with treatment. 81 The majority view is that 
physicians should not have to be "mind readers" to determine what a 
patient would need to know before deciding to undergo treatment. 82 
Therefore, courts in informed consent cases defer to what the medical 
profession thinks patients need to know as opposed to what a patient 
believes she would need or want to know. 83 The implications of the 
law's deference to the standards of the medical profession will be 
discussed below with respect to the optimal policy solution. 
77. See MORREIM. supra note 15, at 44'. 
78. [d. at 44. 
79. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3 at 150. 315. 
80. See Culbertson v. Memitz. 602 N.E.2d 98.100 (Ind. 1992). 
81. [d. at 100-01. 
82. [d. at 103. 
83. [d. at 100. 
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C. Malpractice 
Malpractice law is another area where the law has incorporated the 
standards of the medical profession. In the usual negligence case, the 
jury decides whether the defendant's conduct was appropriate with 
reference to how a "reasonable person" would have acted in similar 
circumstances. Courts, however, decide medical negligence very 
differently. The prevailing belief is that the jury lacks sufficient 
knowledge and training to determine whether a physician's actions in 
treating a patient were reasonable.84 Juries, therefore, evaluate a 
physician's actions in a particular case not by what the jury believes 
is right or "reasonable," as in ordinary cases, but by the custom or 
standard of care that prevails in the medical profession. Unlike other 
negligence claims, "[t]he standards for evaluating the delivery of 
professional medical services are not normally established by either 
[the] judge or jury. The medical profession itself sets the standards of 
practice and the courts enforce these standards .... ,,85 
Drawing on general principles of negligence, medical malpractice 
is defined as "a failure to exercise the 'required degree of care, skill 
and diligence' under the circumstances," which failure causes injury 
to the patient. 86 Courts determine the standard of care by which to 
measure a physician's negligence with reference to the level of skill 
and knowledge that a reasonable physician should possess, 
considering the facilities and equipment available in that physician's 
locality.87 The particular standard of care that is ultimately applied in 
a malpractice suit is derived from leaders in the medical profession 
and the interaction of physicians through peer-reviewed journals and 
professional meetings.88 These standards often account for different 
practice styles and expectations that frequently exist in different 
regions of the country.89 Recently, physicians' groups have 
developed practice guidelines for various specialties, which parties to 
84. See FuRROW. ET AL., supra note 3, at 270. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 269. 
87. See id. at 269, 470. 
88. [d. at 271. 
89. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 271. 
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a suit can use as evidence in determining whether a physician 
exercised due care.90 The usefulness of such guidelines in fashioning 
a solution to the policy problem 'will be outlined below. Most courts 
"give professional medical standards conclusive weight, so that the 
trier of fact is not allowed to reject the practice as improper.,,91 
Notably, physicians cannot assert as a defense to a malpractice action 
that they were under pressure from a managed care organization to 
delay or limit care. 
With the rise of managed care has come a new twist on malpractice 
liability. Recent malpractice cases are premised not simply on 
medical mistake, but on the fact that in rendering treatment, the 
pressure to ration care corrupted or tainted the physician's 
judgment.92 Although punitive damages are relatively rare in 
malpractice cases, "[t]he potential for punitive damages may be 
vastly heightened as juries increasingly begin to learn of the financial 
incentives that HMOs and other forms of constrained insurance create 
for doctors to minimize treatment costs. ,,93 As will be discussed 
below, this liability has important fairness and utilitarian implications 
that define the policy problem and support the need for a policy 
response. 
D. Contract Law 
Contract law previously had little to do with the relationship 
between physicians and insurers or third-party payers.94 
Traditionally, health insurance contracts "incorporate[d] by reference 
the norms and standards of the medical profession. ,,95 Payer and 
provider obligations in such contracts were defined exclusively by 
physicians and insurance contracts typically agreed to provide 
90. [d. at 271-72. 
91. Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 1. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 28, 31 (2001). 
92. See CLARK C. HA VIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIV ATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF 
HEALTH REFORM 112 (AEI Press 1995). 
93. WILLIAM 1. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 331 (5th ed. 1998). 
94. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 92, at 110. 
95. See id. at 112. 
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payment for health care services that were "medically necessary.,,96 
Only the physician, subject to certain ethical and legal constraints, 
would define what was and was not medically necessary.97 Given 
that the medical profession specifically rejects considerations of cost 
as part of determining what is' medically necessary, traditional health 
insurance contracts effectively contained no provision for rationing 
care.98 In addition, by incorporating professional norms into 
traditional insurance contracts, these contracts reflected the medical 
profession's requirement that third-party payers had no place in the 
treatment relationship.99 To physicians, contracts had little to do with 
the way they practiced medicine. 
However, the development of managed care has given contracts a 
much more central role in both the physician-payer relationship and 
the physician-patient relationship.loo First, although "medical 
necessity" may still be a necessary benchmark for whether a health 
plan will pay for services, it is no longer sufficient. 101 In addition, 
contract law has become an important part of the delivery of health 
care partly because managed care has penetrated to such a level that 
most physicians now must participate in a managed care plan to keep 
their practices viable. 102 MeOs are able then to use this power to 
require physicians to adhere to standard form contracts that contain 
many provisions that are not only friendly to the MeO, but also 
directly affect the way in which the physician practices medicine. 103 
Therefore, Meos have successfully drawn on contract law and used 
it as part of their strategy to control the physician's delivery of health 
care services. 104 For example, standard managed care contracts 
typically contain "hold harmless" clauses in which MeOs attempt to 
shift liability for poor patient outcomes to the participating 
96. [d. at 112. 125. 
97. See id. at 125-26. 
98. [d. at 112. 125. 
99. [d. at 112. 
100. See Little. supra note 20. at 1405. 
101. See HAVIGHURST. supra note 92. at 125-26. 
102. See Little. supra note 20. at 1405. 
103. [d. at 1402. 1407. 
104. [d. at 1407. 
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physicians, even if the patient's injury can be attributed to the MCO's 
denying authorization for, delaying, or otherwise not covering a 
physician's recommended procedure or plan of treatment. 105 In 
addition, standard managed care contracts typically contain the terms 
of both negative and positive financial incentives for physicians to 
limit care. 106 Finally, one of the most significant provisions 
contained in most standard MCO contracts allows the MCO to 
terminate the physician from the managed care plan with little notice 
or opportunity for a hearing if the physician does not sufficiently 
comply with the MCO's cost-containment strategies. 107 Though once 
of little consequence, contract law now clearly provides a powerful 
vehicle for implementing MCO's cost-containment strategies by 
providing the means to control physician behavior and shaping how 
medical treatment is delivered. 
E. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
"The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
is undoubtedly the most influential statute affecting the financing of 
health care in the United States."IOS Despite this fact, Congress did 
not intend for ERISA necessarily to deal with health care financing, 
but instead passed it, long before managed care, in response to reports 
of fraud and mismanagement of employee retirement funds. 109 
Congress primarily intended to safeguard employee pensions by 
regulating employee benefit plans. 110 Because ERISA applies to all 
employee benefit plans, however, it covers employer-provided health' 
insurance. "ERISA plans are now the leading source of payment for 
health services nationwide, with more than seventy five percent of all 
managed care plans ERISA-qualified." 111 
ERISA has a significant effect on health benefit plans by providing 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 1400-01. 
lOS. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 423. 
109. [d. at 424. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. at 441. 
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substantial protection to MCOs. 
ERISA itself imposes few requirements on employee health 
benefit plans, and provides minimal remedies for employees 
who are adversely affected by health plan decisions. On the 
other hand, ERISA preempts a wide range of state laws and 
remedies intended to protect health plan beneficiaries, often 
leaving plan beneficiaries wholly stripped of legal protection 
from health plan abuses. I 12 
ERISA has this impact for several reasons. First, the Act expressly 
preempts "any state law which 'relates to' an employee benefit 
plan." II 3 This preemption is significant because it has left states 
unable to significantly regulate MCOs and has left plan participants 
with limited or no remedies against such plans. I 14 "As ERISA does 
not itself regulate or provide remedies against health plans except to a 
very limited extent, ERISA preemption generally results in a 
regulatory and liability vacuum, allowing health plans to behave as 
they choose with little accountability to their members or to the 
public." I 15 
Second, ERISA not only preempts state law relating to employee 
benefit plans, but also has been interpreted to preempt state 
jurisdiction and remedies with respect to employee health benefit 
plans. 116 Because state jurisdiction, substantive law, and remedies are 
all preempted, a plaintiff injured by a health benefit plan must bring 
suit in federal court, and may only recover the benefits due to her 
under the terms of the plan. ERISA does not allow recovery of 
compensatory or punitive damages to compensate a plan participant 
for injuries and, therefore, restricts substantially the amount of 
recovery possible in what would be an ordinary tort case. 117 
In the early years of managed care, ERISA was used successfully 
112. [d. at 424. 
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2002); see also FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 424. 
114. See FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 424. 
lIS. [d. at 429. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 442. 
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to provide nearly complete protection from tort liability for managed 
care plans. 118 Recently, however, some federal courts have limited 
this preemption, finding that many tort claims have little impact on 
the administration of an employee benefit plan. I 19 However, for the 
most part, courts have continued to interpret ERISA preemption 
broadly, holding in most cases that state laws regulating insurance 
and managed care "relate to" an ERISA plan and are therefore 
preempted. 120 MCas therefore have been able to continue to use 
ERISA preemption to severely limit the remedies available to 
plaintiffs who claim MCa negligence. Despite some recent cases 
holding that ERISA preemption does not apply to some types of 
MCa conduct,121 the Act remains a formidable defense for managed 
care plans. 
F. Managed Care Legislation 
The legal framework surrounding managed care is a work in 
progress; In addition to triggering new applications of existing law, 
managed care has been the subject of numerous legislative initiatives 
at both the federal and state levels. Indeed, more than 1,000 bills 
were introduced in response to public outrage over managed care 
from 1995 through 1997.122 Significantly, none of these laws permit 
physicians to ration health care. 
Commentator David Hyman gives an overview of managed care 
legislation by dividing the measures into two categories. 123 He 
describes Type I as "provisions which affect the relationship between 
health care providers and managed care organizations" and Type IT as 
"provisions which affect the relationship between health care 
providers and patients, including the scope of covered services.,,124 
118. See id. at 430-31. 
119. FuRROW, ET AL., supra note 3, at 432. 
120. [d. at 433. 
121. See, e.g., Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that ERISA does not preempt state provisions imposing liability on HMOs). 
122. David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: With Friends Like These . .. , in 
HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK 286 (Alice Grossfield ed .• West 1998). 
123. See id. at 286-87. 
124. [d. 
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Examples of Type I legislation include "any willing provider" state 
laws, which restrict the ability of MCOs to contract with whichever 
physicians they choose; contain due process provisions; and prohibit 
"gag" clauses that prevent the physician from discussing with the 
patient treatment options that the plan does not cover or authorize. 125 
Examples of Type IT legislation include "consumer protection" 
measures that ensure direct access to some specialists; mandatory 
coverage of certain procedures such as reasonable emergency room 
visits; and forty-eight hour hospital stays after childbirth.126 In 
addition, many states have mandated external appeals of coverage 
denials.127 Some states have passed comprehensive regulatory 
schemes. 128 . As discussed above, ERISA has limited to a great extent 
these state reform efforts through preemption. 
On the federal level, several proposals, some in the form of a 
"Patients' Bill of Rights," would provide individuals, along with 
other protections, a right to sue MCOs and thereby effectively 
eliminate the ERISA protections MCOs now enjoy.129 These targeted 
federal and state initiatives, while somewhat helpful, do not fully 
alleviate the effects of the policy problem. 
m. THE POLICY PROBLEM 
The policy problem is a general one, but with very specific effects. 
This article assumes. as a starting point. that society must control 
health care costs. The policy problem stems from the fact that the . 
rules that have an impact on the way physicians practice medicine 
reflect an era in which fee-for-service medicine predominated. and 
the physician operated with nearly complete autonomy. including the 
freedom to ignore costs. 130 The shift to managed care, with its 
significant third-party payer role in the treatment relationship, does 
more than simply add a layer of accountability to health care delivery. 
125. See id. at 287. 
126. [d. at 288. 
127. Hyman. supra note 122. at 289. 
128. [d. at 287; see, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 88.0001 et seq. 
129. See Hyman. supra note 122. at 289. 
130. See supra Part II. 
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Managed care fundamentally changes a physician's obligations and 
incentives with respect to providing health care and also puts in direct 
conflict the physician's traditional ethical and legal obligations 
toward her patient and the physician's obligation to control health 
care costS. 131 
A. The General Policy Problem 
Health care scholars Mark Hall and Haavi Morreim have discussed 
this general policy problem in detail. Hall notes that managed health 
care requires physicians to ration at the bedside because MCOs 
reward physicians for cutting costs in delivering health cOare and 
penalizes them in various ways for spending more on health care 
delivery than the MCO has determined is an appropriate level. 132 He 
explains, however, that the dominant view is that there is an absolute 
moral prohibition against physicians considering the costs of 
treatment. 133 This moral prohibition is reflected in physicians' ethics 
as well as in writings by a variety of health care scholars about the 
physician-patient relationship.134 Hall explains that the law strongly 
disfavors physicians making medical spending decisions or 
rationing. 135 
Hall supports this assertion by detailing research he conducted 
reviewing all judicial opinions on health insurance for the past thirty-
five years that involved a question as to whether a proposed treatment 
was medically appropriate and therefore should be covered by 
insurance.136 He concluded that both public and private insurers lost 
nearly 60% of the coverage denials that they sought to uphold in 
court, and courts found few factors that would affect an insurer's 
success in having the denial sustained.137 In addition, Hall found that 
judicial review of proposed coverage denials was most stringent 
131. See HALL, supra note 5. at 131. 
132. See id. at 114. 
133. See id. at 115. 
134. [d. at 114-15. 
135. [d. at 115-16. 
136. [d. at 68. 
137. HALL supra note 5 at 68. 
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when courts suspected that an economic motivation, and not the lack 
of medical justification, was the reason behind the denial of 
coverage. 138 Hall notes that in such instances, courts "see a profit-
making insurer who has already received its premium refusing to 
honor reasonable treatment requests by a sick patient.,,139 Other types 
of health-care cases also demonstrate the preference for providing all 
beneficial care, regardless of cost. 140 
Hall asserts that this preference no longer makes sense, that current 
legal rules disfavoring, even prohibiting, health 'care rationing by 
physicians are "out of step with current economic and medical 
realities." 141 Indeed, it is not just that the law fails to reflect current 
realities, but that the failure to reflect these realities and allow for 
rationing is a significant moral issue. 142 H~ll argues that "the fact 
that a number of thoughtful physicians and patients feel strongly and 
sincerely about the moral degeneracy of HMOs provides no basis for 
framing those personal beliefs in absolutist or categorical ethical 
terms.,,143 Physicians' ethical requirement to provide patients with all 
care that could possibly be of benefit, regardless of cost, and the 
demise of the fee-for-service system and subsequent rise of managed 
health care clearly illustrates, according to Hall, the contingency of 
moral values. 144 Viewed in this way, the physician's ethic to provide 
all care "is an idiosyncratic artifact of the culture of attitudes and 
behavior generated by outmoded forms of insurance.,,145 Requiring 
physicians to provide all potentially beneficial health care, while 
138. See id. 
139. Id. 
140. See, e.g., In re Baby K. 16 F.3d 590,598 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the hospital must provide 
care to anencephalic infant, where mother requested it, despite the fact that physicians maintained care 
was futile, and it cost well over one million dollars). 
141. HALL, supra note 5, at 117. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 131. Hall notes that philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argued that moral values are 
contingent upon the nature of the culture in which they operate, and are not universally true. [d. at 130. 
MacIntyre thus warns against elevating individual beliefs to the scale of a universal moral principle. Id. 
at 131. 
144. [d. at 131. 
145. Id. Troyen Brennan highlights this point in stating that "[tlhe ethical theory of medicine was 
thus integral to, and sustained by, the economic and political structure of medical practice." BRENNAN, 
supra note II, at 49. 
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ignoring its cost, assumes that society has unlimited resources. 146 In 
Hall's view, therefore, outside of the' fee-for-service system, no 
ethical basis exists for requiring physicians to provide all potentially 
beneficial health care regardless of cost. 147 
Haavi Morreim supports this conception of the policy problem. 148 
She notes that "the law, it appears, suffers from the same economic 
naivete that infuses traditional moral notions of fidelity.,,149 With the 
drive to control health care costs, it is necessary to take another look 
at physicians' traditional ethic of uncompromised fidelity to their 
patients. 150 It may no longer be realistic to expect that physicians will 
pursue their patients' interests over those of society, third-party 
payers, and even themselves. 151 
It is no longer plausible to demand that physicians literally 
always place patients' interests above their own, for in some 
cases this will entail a self-sacrifice that is surely beyond the call 
of duty. And we can no longer presume absolutely that the 
physician will promote his patients' interests above the 
competing claims of other patients, or of payers, institutional 
providers, and society as a whole. We must therefore consider 
more closely just what the physician owes his patient and, 
equally important, what he does not owe. 152 
Traditional notions of fidelity to patients, reflected in medical 
ethics as well as the law, require physicians to promote their patients' . 
interests above all others. Yet the economics of health care make this 
requirement unrealistic. 153 This longstanding indifference to the cost 
of health care is now untenable because it requires the physician to 
deliver care with resources that he does not control. 154 
146. HALL, supra note 5, at 131. 
147. ld. 
148. See MORREIM, supra note IS, at 64. 
149. See id. at 86. 
150. ld. at 64. 
151. ld. 
152. ld. 
153. ld. at 86. 
154. MORREIM, supra note IS, at 86. 
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[A] particular medical morality has developed. The physician is 
duty bound to treat the patient with greatest respect. The 
physician must maintain a loyalty to the patient and engender the 
patient's trust. The patient must 'come first' even if this 
requires some self-effacement and sacrifice on the part of the 
physician . . . . Other concerns should not intrude on this 
relationship. The moral code of beneficence works best if it is 
isolated from the usual concerns of the liberal state, especially 
the competitive market. 155 
The law reinforces this isolation of the medical profession and its 
ethics from the consequences of the costs of the care it delivers. 156 
The result is that the law exposes the physician to potential liability 
for "failing to do the impossible.,,157 
In summary, the general policy problem stems from the fact that 
the law with respect to physician liability does not fully account for 
changes that have arisen as a result of the change from fee-for-service 
medicine to managed health care. This conflict takes on greater 
importance because the physician is not simply put in an ethical 
dilemma by manage~ health care. She faces potential legal liability 
and severe economic hann. 
B. Potential Malpractice Liability 
One of the specific manifestations of the general policy problem is 
that physicians who are forced to ration at the bedside because of 
participation in the managed care system face potential malpractice 
liability. 
[P]hysicians must choose between long-standing medico-legal 
expectations and the reality of cost-containment measures. As a 
result of the profound economic changes in the health care 
delivery system, a practicing physician . . . has essentially 
155. BRENNAN. supra note II, at 48. 
156. See MORREIM. supra note 15. at 86. 
157. See id. 
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become the administrator of medical resource allocation. This 
new role has impinged on the traditional standard of care 
required of physicians .... The jurisprudential dilemma arises 
when the medico-legal unitary standard of care is applied to the 
physician's other role as a resource manager. 15S 
667 
One of the earliest cases to illustrate the issue is Wickline v. State 
of Calijomia. 159 The central issue in that case was whether a plaintiff 
could sue a third-party payer, Medi-Cal, for negligence where a cost-
containment strategy allegedly affected the treating physician's 
judgment and the patient subsequently suffered harm. 160 The patient, 
Lois Wickline, received health care benefits under California's Medi-
Cal program. 161 Doctors diagnosed Wickline with arteriosclerosis, 
which caused an obstruction of the terminal aorta. 162 Her physician 
recommended surgery and obtained authorization from Medi-Cal for 
the procedure and ten days of post-operative hospitalization. 163 
Wickline had complications following the surgery and required two 
subsequent surgeries to eliminate clotting and restore blood flow to 
her leg. l64 Due to these and other potential complications, her 
physician recommended that she remain in the hospital an additional 
eight days. 165 
The hospital completed the required forms and submitted them to 
Medi-Cal requesting the additional eight-day stay.166 Medi-Cal's 
first-line utilization review agent, a registered nurse, did not believe 
the request warranted an additional eight days.167 She referred the 
158. Hedgeman, supra note 4, at 306-08. Scholar Clark Havighurst states simply that "[alt this stage 
in the managed care revolution ... cOIpOrate health plans have assumed extensive responsibility for the 
cost of care without accepting more than nominal responsibility for its quality. Only a minute's 
reflection should suggest that this situation is unlikely to be satisfactory as a matter of public policy." 
Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability; Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 13 (2000). 
159. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
16.Q. [d.at811. 
161. [d. at 812. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
164. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812. 
165. [d. at 813. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 814. 
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case to a Medi-Cal physician "consultant," who instead authorized 
four additional days.16S The physician consultant based his decision 
on factors that Wickline and her physicians contended were irrelevant 
to her circulatory condition. 169 Additionally, the physician consultant 
did not discuss the case with a Medi-Cal consultant who specialized 
in vascular surgery before making his decision. 17o Wickline's 
physicians complied with Medi-Cal's decision and released her from 
the hospital after four additional days.171 Nine days later, Wickline 
returned to the hospital with a severe infection and clotting 
problems. l72 Her physicians found it was necessary to amputate her 
leg below the knee to save her life.173 Wickline's lawsuit alleged that 
had she remained in the hospital the additional days; she would not 
have lost her leg. 174 Yet in bringing suit, she did not allege that her 
physicians committed malpractice or were in any way liable. 175 The 
case attracted attention because the court held: 
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally 
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from 
. defects in the design or implementation of cost containment 
mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's 
behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or 
unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 176 
Yet the court went on to qualify its holding with respect to third-party 
payers by stating that "the physician who complies without protest 
with the limitations imposed by a third-party payor, when his medical 
judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility 
for his patient's care."I77 The court continued to say that "[h]e 
16S. [d. 
169. Wickline. 239 Cal. Rptr. at SIS. 
170. /d. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. at S16. 
173. [d. 
174. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at S17. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at S19. 
177. [d. 
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cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when 
the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go 
sour.,,178 
Significantly, the court stated that, although Medi-Cal intimidated 
Wickline's physician, he should have made more of an effort to 
challenge its determination that her coverage entitled her to only an 
additional four days in the hospital. 179 The court noted that 
Wickline's physicians authorized her discharge, and as such, "Medi-
Cal was not a party to that medical decision and therefore [could not] 
be held to share in the harm resulting if such decision was negligently 
made.,,180 The court concluded by stating: 
This court appreciates that what is at issue here is the effect of 
cost containment programs upon the professional judgment of 
physicians .... While we recognize, realistically, that cost 
consciousness has become a permanent feature of the health care 
system, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be 
permitted to corrupt medical judgment. lSI 
Although the Wickline case was noteworthy because it allowed for 
the fact that, in some cases, a third-party payer might be legally 
responsible for poor medical outcomes that can be linked to cost-
containment strategies,182 the case is also significant from a policy 
perspective regarding the role of physicians in cost containment. 
While recognizing that cost containment in health care was a new 
policy that "ha[ d] become a permanent feature of the health care 
system," the court's opinion perpetuated a long-held policy with 
respect to physician liability.183 The court's narrow and unrealistic 
interpretation of the facts of the case, that essentially Wickline's 
treating physicians were divorced from the cost containment 
178. /d. 
179. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 820 (emphasis added). 
182. With respect to third-party liability, subsequent opinions limit the Wickline case, and it has not 
provided the basis for any meaningful liability for MCOs enforcing cost-containment policies. 
183. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820. 
670 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:641 
decisions made with respect to her health benefits, ensured that 
physicians still retained full liability for treatment decisions, even 
though they no longer solely make these decisions. 
The policy revealed by the Wickline case is illustrated in more 
recent cases as well. For instance, in Neade v. Portes,l84 the plaintiff 
brought suit against her husband's physician and his practice for 
medical malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.18S The central 
issue in the case was whether, in the context of a medical malpractice 
action, a patient has a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty 
against the physician for failing to disclose that the physician had 
fInancial incentives to limit care pursuant to an arrangement with an 
MCO. 186 
In Neade, the plaintiff's husband consulted his primary care 
physician for chest pain and shortness of breath.187 Neade had a 
family history of heart disease, suffered from hypertension, was 
overweight, smoked heavily, and had high cholesterol. 188 The 
primary care physician briefly hospitalized him and conducted certain 
tests, including a thallium stress test and an electrocardiogram 
(EKG).189 Doctors concluded that the results of these tests were 
normal, and the hospital discharged him with a diagnosis of a hiatal 
hernia and/or esophagitis. 190 
Several days later, Neade returned to his primary care physician 
still complaining of chest pain. 191 The physician, relying on the 
results of the thallium stress test and EKG, determined that the chest 
pain was not cardiac related. 192 Neade returned the following month, 
complaining of severe chest pain. 193 Neade's primary care physician 
requested that his associate examine him. 194 Based on this exam, the 
184. 739 N.E.2d 496 (Dl. 2(00). 
185. [d. at 499. 
186. [d. at 498. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. 
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primary care physician's associate recommended an angiogram, a test 
that is better at diagnosing coronary artery disease than a thallium 
stress test. 195 The primary care physician refused to order the 
angiogram. 196 Several months later, Neade returned to his primary 
care physician again complaining of chest pain. 197 Once again, an 
associate of the primary care physician recommended an angiogram, 
but his primary care physician refused, citing the normal thallium 
stress test. 198 A few months later Neade suffered a massive heart 
attack and died. 199 
The plaintiff alleged that her husband's primary care physician had 
negotiated a contract with an HMO pursuant to which the physician's 
group would receive from the HMO $75,000 per year, called the 
"Medical Incentive Fund," to be used by the group to cover costs for 
patient referrals and outside tests?oo Under the contract with the 
HMO, whatever portion of the Medical Incentive Fund that the 
practice group did not use for referrals or outside tests was divided up 
at the end of the year; the primary care physician's group received 
60% of the remaining funds and the HMO received 40%.201 If the 
fund was depleted, the HMO required the primary care physician and 
his group to make up the difference. 202 The plaintiff was not aware 
of this arrangement at the time her husband sought care.203 The court 
held that the plaintiff could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty separate from a medical malpractice claim; the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim was unnecessary because the "traditional 
medical negligence claim sufficiently addresses the same alleged 
misconduct.,,204 The court did hold, however, that to the extent the 
primary care physician testified in his defense at trial, the plaintiff 
could use evidence of the Medical Incentive Fund and the physician's 
195. [d. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. at 499. 
198. [d. 
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potential gain from it to impeach his credibility.205 
Like Wickline, Neade is significant in that it illustrates the potential 
for liability where a physician acts to control costs. Unlike Wickline, 
the decisions in Neade were solely in the hands of the treating 
physician. However, the policy issue is the same. The court held that 
considerations of cost in treating a patient and any resulting harm 
were squarely within the realm of a malpractice suit. 206 The court 
even went so far as to say that financial incentives that aim to control 
costs by placing the physician's interests directly at odds with those 
of the patient could be used at trial as evidence against the physician 
to impeach his credibility.207 Clearly, the prevailing public policy is 
that limiting care with cost in mind should not be part of the 
physician-patient relationship. 
Though Wickline and Neade directly address the physician's role in 
cost containment activities by MCOs, other cases in which the 
physician receives little attention from the court illustrate the policy 
problem. In both Pegram v. Herdrich,208 and Andrews-Clarke v. 
Travelers Insurance,209 the courts noted that, although the plaintiffs 
had brought suit against the managed care organization, separate suits 
were pending against the providers. 
In addition, traditional malpractice liability may, at least in some 
states, expand to include liability for failing to advocate on behalf of 
the patient for the approval of health benefits. In those situations, 
plaintiffs would premise negligence on a duty that requires more than 
care and skill in directly treating the patient. In Nealy v. U.S. 
Healthcare HMO,210 the plaintiff alleged that a physician delayed in 
submitting the appropriate form to the HMO requesting authorization 
for a visit with an out-of-network cardiologist.211 The HMO 
ultimately denied authorization, and the patient died.212 The . court 
205. [d. at 506. 
206. [d. at 504. 
207. [d. at 506. 
208. 530 U.s. 211 (2000). 
209. 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). 
210. 711 N.E.2d621 (N.Y. 1999). 
211. Nealy, 711 N.E.2d at 622-23. 
212. [d. at 623. 
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held that ERISA did not preempt the claim against the physician and 
that it could proceed in state court under a malpractice theory because 
the complaint alleged the physician failed to take timely action to 
treat the patient.213 As the court stated in Pryzbowski v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc.,214 "Nealy stands for the proposition that under New 
York law the physician's duties in providing care to hislher patients 
may be broader than the mere medical treatment decision.,,215 In 
Pryzbowski, the plaintiff brought a claim against her treating 
physicians claiming they had a duty to advocate on her behalf for the 
timely approval of benefits.216 The court rejected the claim, but left 
open the possibility for such a claim in the future. 217 
In summary, the law clearly does not fully embrace the notion of 
physicians' cutting costs in health care when such decisions result in 
limiting services to individual patients. This policy choice raises 
important issues of fundamental fairness. In addition, and more 
importantly, the policy of viewing physicians and health-care payers 
as being on different teams with respect to cost containment has 
significant utilitarian effects. 
C. The Threat of Deselection/Terminationfrom an Mea 
A second manifestation of the policy problem is that physicians 
who participate with managed care plans often face termination or 
"deselection" from the plan at any time, without a showing of 
cause.218 Physicians who do not ration care or control costs in line 
with MCOs' policies, or who advocate too strongly for patient care, 
fear and often face termination from the plan?19 However, as 
discussed above, rationing care to comply with an MCO's cost-
containment strategy often carries the threat of malpractice liability. 
In an effort to contain health-care costs, MCOs select physicians 
213. [d. at 625. 
214. 245 F.3d 266. 280 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
215. [d. at 280. 
216. [d. at 270. 
217. [d. at 281-82. 
218. See Richard S. Liner. Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the Physician-
Patient Relationship. 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 511. 516 (1997). 
219. See generally Liner. supra note 218. at 516-18. 
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who will provide quality health care at the lowest cost to be part of 
their plans.22o Once physicians are on the plan, MeOs use several 
strategies to ensure their health-care costs remain controlled. These 
strategies include capitation arrangements, financial incentives, 
utilization review, and other methods. An important part of the cost 
containment strategy, however, is tracking the economic performance 
of individual physicians.221 Physicians who do not meet MeO's 
economic performance criteria and, less often, quality criteria, are 
terminated or "deselected" from the plan.222 MeOs reserve the right 
to terminate without cause through a typical provision contained in 
MeO-physician contracts.223 Such provisions often permit the plan 
to deselect the physician with little or no notice at any time during the 
contract period?24 Similarly, these provisions typically give the 
MeO the power simply not to renew the agreement at the end of the 
contract term?25 "Deselection acts as a check on physicians by 
allowing MeOs to eliminate those physicians providing unnecessary 
or excessive care, or exceeding the MeO's expected costs for patient 
care .... Terminations without cause, however, often have more to do 
with economic factors than competence or quality.,,226 
The economic factors that weigh into the deselection decision are 
often not apparent to the physician.227 "Physicians. . . often have no 
knowledge of their MeO's economic expectations in the 
credentialing process.,,228 Indeed, physicians' treatment decisions, 
scrutinized by Meos for economic efficiency, are usually within the 
accepted standard of care. The standard of care does not generally 
incorporate cost considerations in the treatment equation. 
On the one hand, the power to deselect physicians who are not 
facilitating an Meo's cost-containment strategy is an important 
220. [d. at 513. 
221. [d. at 516-17. 
222. [d. at 516-17. 
223. [d. at 516. 
224. Uner, supra note 218, at 516. 
225. [d. at 516. 
226. [d. at 516-17. 
227. [d. at 517. 
228. [d. 
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one.229 In striving to keep costs down,MCOs must have the ability 
to remove physicians from their respective plans, or controlling 
health care costs might be doomed to fail. However, deselection is 
problematic when viewed in light of the circumstances in which this 
power is deployed. Physicians are now economically dependent upon 
MCOS.230 Participation with an MCO, especially in some practice 
areas, is necessary for physicians to have a sufficient patient pool to 
sustain their practices.23J Due to MCOs' market power, physicians 
not only must participate in the plan, but they also have little ability 
to negotiate the terms under which they deal with the plan.232 
Physicians report that MCOs have threatened deselection or even 
terminated physicians for appealing an adverse coverage decision on 
behalf of a patient. 233 This report is particularly troublesome given 
that, in some jurisdictions, a physician may be liable for not working 
hard enough through appeals or otherwise to secure treatment for the 
patient.234 Moreover, some physicians privately confess that they are 
reluctant to take on new patients who may be severely or chronically 
ill, because of the high costs involved in treating such patients.235 
The consequences of deselection for the physician are greater than 
simply losing patients and income.236 Other MCOs are less likely to 
accept a previously deselected physician.237 Additionally, deselection 
may damage physicians' reputations.238 Even when a physician has 
not faced deselection, the threat of termination without cause, at any 
time, causes great anxiety, often motivating physicians to consider 
their livelihood and the MCO's interest ahead of, or at least 
concurrently with, the patient's needs.239 However, these 
229. Liner. supra note 218. at 516. 
230. See id. at 517; Little. supra note 20. at 1402. 
231. See Little. supra note 20. at 1427-28. 
232. See id. at 1402. 
233. See id. at 1446; Ken Terry. No Cause Terminations: Will They Go Up in Flames? MED. EcON .• 
Jan. 12. 1998. at 130. 
234. See supra Part ill.B. 
235. See Terry, supra note 233. at 130. 
236. Liner. supra note 218, at 517. 
237. [d. 
238. [d. 
239. [d. at 517-18. 
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considerations can lead to potential malpractice liability?40 
Some states have recognized that terminating or deselecting a 
physician from a plan has important public policy effects. 241 In the 
last several years, at least twelve states have enacted legislation to 
deal with the issue.242 These laws generally require that the MeO 
inform the physician of the reason for termination in writing, provide 
some type of appeals process, or provide physicians with the criteria 
for the "economic credentialing" that is often the reason for 
deselection.243 MeOs point out that the more protections physicians 
receive, the greater the chance of passing the costs on to the 
consumer. Physicians assert that most state statutes are ineffective 
because they provide MeOs with too many 100pholes.244 For 
instance, some states that require an appeals process permit the Meo 
to appoint the review panel, effectively making it an in-house 
appeal. 245 Additionally, state laws generally do not cover contract 
renewals. MeOs are able to wait until the end of the contract term 
(typically the end of the year) and simply refuse to renew a 
physician's contract instead of deselecting him or her mid_year.246 
Therefore, these initiatives do not provide complete protection for 
physicians. Indeed, despite these efforts to alleviate some of the 
concern over deselection, physicians still fear that MeOs could 
terminate them. Both the actual termination from an MeO and the 
fear of termination have important policy effects. 
D. Ethical Issues Raised by the Policy Problem 
Some commentators argue that, with relatively few published 
decisions evidencing any actual physician liability for rationing 
decisions made within the context of managed care, the problem is 
not as significant as has been asserted. Similarly, it may be argued 
240. See supra Part m.B . 
. 241. See generally Terry. supra note 233. 
242. See id. at 130. 
243. [d. 
244. See id. at 134. 
245. See id. at 140. 
246. Terry. supra note 233. at 134. 
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that MCOs actually terminate few physicians from plans, and· 
therefore the threat of termination is not enough to raise an ethical 
concern. This is simply not the case. Although holding physicians 
liable for rationing decisions made under pressure from MCOs raises 
significant ethical issues, the threat or fear of liability or termination 
felt by physicians has perhaps even more important policy effects. 
1. Fundamental Fairness 
The first area in which the policy problem presents troubling 
ethical issues is with respect to notions of fundamental· fairness. 
Society faces a pressing need to control health care costs. Controlling 
costs necessarily involves physicians, who are the agents responsible 
for actually delivering care. Yet our current legal framework, while 
sanctioning cost-cutting programs by MCOs, does not also sanction 
cost cutting through bedside rationing by physicians.247 Therefore, 
MCOs that encourage and indeed require physicians to control costs 
routinely escape liability for poor patient outcomes, while physicians 
do not. This problem forms the basis for an ethical claim that the 
current legal structure is fundamentally unfair. 
Craig Carr explains the moral value of a fairness claim in his work 
On Fairness.248 He notes that fairness "raises significant moral 
concerns, and claims about being treated unfairly carry considerable 
moral weight-at least as much, if not more, than claims about being 
treated unjustly or unequally.,,249 Carr states that there are several 
features of fairness derived from the "meager literature" on the 
subject: 
1. Fairness involves not disadvantaging others. 
2. Fairness involves being unbiased, impartial, or neutral in our 
treatment of others. 
3. Fairness involves sharing burdens or benefits equally, or 
maintaining a proper proportion between benefit and 
247. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2000). 
248. CRAIG L. CARR, ON FAIRNESS (Ashgate 2000). 
249. [d. at 1. 
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contribution. 
4. Fairness involves treating equal or similar cases equally or 
similarly. 
5. Fairness involves adhering to the rules. 
6. Fairness involves treating others with the concern and respect 
they deserve.25o 
In addition to this list, Carr suggests that fairness involves another 
dimension. He 
locate[s] fairness within the context of moral concerns that 
govern the activity of joining with others and pursuing some 
type of cooperative venture. Fairness ... matters from a moral 
point of view because it is a central virtue of cooperation, and 
we are, of course, social beings who both want and need to 
cooperate with one another.25J 
Carr finds that fairness requires that people perform their share of 
the work and that they get their share of what they helped produce.252 
Fairness "precludes a particular type of free-riding; people who 
benefit from the fact that others submit to certain rules are presumed 
to stand under an obligation to submit to these rules themselves.,,253 
The situations in which the principles of fairness have particular 
moral force are those where the individuals involved are linked in 
some way as fellow participants in a social practice or activity.254 
Therefore, according to Carr, the moral heart of fairness is that parties 
who are linked in some type of cooperative venture must share the 
burdens as well as the benefits.255 In the case of physicians and 
MCOs, it can be argued that the parties are linked in a cooperative 
venture-providing health care while controlling costs. Though 
many physicians might assert that they are in no way working 
250. [d. at 2. 
251. [d. at 2-3. 
252. [d. at 26. 
253. CARR. supra note 248. at 26. 
254. [d. 
255. [d. 
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together with MCOs, and in fact perceive themselves to be in an 
adversarial relationship with them, the fact remains that each is an 
indispensable party to the goal of providing health care while 
controlling costs. Today, nearly all physicians are dependent upon 
MCOs for patients and reimbursements, and MCOs cannot control 
costs without relying upon physicians to make judgments that ration 
care at the bedside.256 
There is an obvious organizational link between physicians and 
MCOs: "While the values of individual physicians undoubtedly play 
a critical role in clinical decision making, the organizations involved 
also wield tremendous amounts of power to shape the context in 
which ethical challenges arise. They play an important part in 
creating cultures that influence physician practices. ,,257 Physicians 
and MCOs are also linked by public policy. The framework of our 
current health care system, which supports employer-provided health 
insurance and encourages cost-containment through managed care, 
envisions and indeed forces physicians and MCOs to work together 
on some level. 
Given that physicians and MCOs are "in it together," so to speak, 
principles of fairness require a just distribution of the burdens of 
providing health care while containing its cost. As a result of the 
policy problem, however, the burdens are not fairly distributed. The 
current policy of encouraging control of health care costs through the 
use of MCOs, which achieves (or attempts to achieve) health care 
cost reductions through the use of bedside rationing, is unfair because 
physicians and MCOs do not share the liability burdens for such 
rationing. While MCOs reap significant benefits through the use of 
cost-containment strategies, the liability burden falls squarely on the 
shoulders of physicians because the law provides MCOs with 
powerful immunity through ERISA. Moreover, the law has not 
accounted for changes in the delivery of health care by modifying 
physician liability. 
256. See Liner. supra note 218. at 516. 
257. See WONG. supra note 14. at 4. 
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The Andrews-Clarke258 case illustrates this unfairness. The 
plaintiff brought suit against the MCa that administered the health 
benefit plan she carried through her employer.259 The plaintiffs 
husband had a severe drinking problem and was hospitalized 
repeatedly for treatment.260 The hospitalizations were only long 
enough to treat whatever acute problem was caused by the husband's 
alcoholism.261 Despite physicians' recommendations for an 
extended, in-patient treatment program, the plaintiff s health insurer 
did not authorize such treatment. 262 The plaintiff s health benefit 
plan, however, explicitly provided for at least one thirty-day in-
patient rehabilitation program per year.263 After the hospital released 
him from a final, alcohol-related overnight stay, the plaintiff s 
husband consumed more alcohol and was subsequently found dead in 
a parked car.264 The plaintiff sued the MCO, claiming that its refusal 
to grant the extended in-patient alcohol treatment that was 
recommended by her husband's physicians, and part of her benefit 
package, caused her husband's death.265 The plaintiff also brought 
state law malpractice claims against the hospitals that treated her 
husband.266 The court noted that "[u]nder traditional notions of 
justice, the harms alleged-if true-should entitle [the plaintiff] to 
some legal remedy on behalf of herself and her children against [the 
MCO].,,267 However, the court noted that ERISA preempted all of 
her claims. 268 The court explained that "the practical impact of 
ERISA in this case is to immunize Travelers and Greenspring- from 
any potential liability for the consequences of their denial of 
benefits.,,269 
258. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co .. 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). 
259. [d. at 50. 
260. [d. at 50-51. 
261. [d.at51. 
262. [d. 
263. Andrews-Clarke. 984 F. Supp. at 51. 
264. [d. at 51-52. 
265. [d. at 52. 
266. [d. 
267. [d. 
268. Andrews-Clarke. 984 F. Supp. at 53-55. 
269. [d. at 55-56 (emphasis in original). 
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The Andrews-Clarke case is typical and clearly illustrates the effect 
of ERISA preemption. As the court stated, "the shield of near 
absolute immunity now provided by ERISA cannot be justified.'.270 
Yet it is not just the unfairness to plaintiffs left without a meaningful 
remedy that is troubling about this policy. There is also a less 
apparent effect on physicians. The court in Andrews-Clarke noted 
this by stating: 
[T]his Court notes that the immunity currently afforded to 
insurers and utilization review providers unfairly leaves doctors, 
"quite literally, caught in the middle in the battle over treatment 
between patients and the HMOs" (citation omitted). Doctors 
who complain too vigorously about denials of care by the 
managed care plan face the risk of being kicked out of the plan's 
network of approved providers (citation omitted). Yet, thanks to 
ERISA, when a treating physician makes a decision to discharge 
a patient because an insurance company refuses to pay benefits, 
the patient's sole recourse is against the physician, and insurers 
are quick to abandon him to litigation (citation omitted). Indeed, 
when asked what remedy was left to [the plaintiff], the insurer's 
lawyer said, "Sue the providers," (i.e., sue the doctors and 
hospitals-but not us) (citation omitted). This result 
contravenes fundamental principles of joint tort liability.271 
As the Andrews-Clarke case illustrates, MCOs receive a 
significant benefit from the current policy that holds physicians fully 
responsible for negative patient outcomes that result from cost-
containment strategies, but very often immunizes the health plans, 
who actually drive such decisions .. Although some recent cases have 
indicated that in limited circumstances MCOs might be liable for 
actions that negatively affect patient outcomes, such exceptions are 
not sweeping or certain enough to mitigate the unfairness of the 
current liability scheme. Moreover, the costs to litigate such issues 
270. [d. at 63. 
271. [d. at 63-64, n.74. 
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raise significant utilitarian concerns. 
Accordingly, although under the former, retrospective fee-for-
service system, where passive third-party payers simply reimbursed a 
physician for whatever care deemed "necessary," the tort liability 
scheme was fair, the same is not true today. Under the former 
system, physicians enjoyed autonomy over their medical decisions. 
They controlled the care the patient received, and by and large, they 
could marshal the resources as part of the care. There was little issue 
of shared responsibility for negative patient outcomes; the physician 
stood alone as the captain of the ship. Thus, the tort liability faced 
solely by physicians might be fair, as a policy matter, if the decision 
of whether to ration care remained solely in the control of physicians. 
2. Utilitarianism 
Though the policy problem outlined above raises significant issues 
of fundamental fairness, this problem alone might not be enough to 
justify a policy change or policy solution. Indeed, if a weightier 
~thical consideration, such as controlling health care costs to keep our 
health care system sustainable and accessible to as many people as 
possible justified the unfairness to physicians, the matter might end 
there. The physician's right to fair treatment with respect to legal 
liability might have to yield in the face of a strong utilitarian 
justification for keeping such a policy in place. However, this is not 
the case. In addition to significant issues of fundamental fairness, the 
policy problem presents a much larger ethical issue, implicating 
significant utilitarian concerns. Specifically, our current policy 
serves ultimately to undermine society's goals of controlling health 
care costs. The costs of the policy problem far outweigh the benefits, 
and as such we are not maximizing health care resources or positive 
health care outcomes. 
An examination of the differences between act utilitarianism and 
rule utilitarianism best explains the effects of the policy problem. An 
agent satisfies act utilitarianism "if and only if he does an act which 
has at least as good consequences as any other available under the 
circumstances. Thus, an agent who satisfies [act utilitarianism] in 
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any situation produces the best consequences he can possibly produce 
in that situation.,,272 In contrast, rule utilitarianism directs "each 
agent to satisfy the set of rules it would be best for everyone to satisfy 
.... ,,273 As will be discussed below, the current liability framework 
applied to physicians is flawed from a rule utilitarian perspective. 
While the prior fee-for-service system and the legal rules that were 
shaped by it might have some "'ethical justification, this system 
ultimately does not encourage conduct that is best for everyone to 
satisfy. Physicians' attempts to satisfy the current liability rules do 
not achieve the best overall health care outcome. 
The policy problem is a complex one, in that the current legal 
framework is not without benefits. First, providing a virtual liability 
shield to MCOs allows them to employ important cost-cutting 
strategies that lead to reduced overall health care spending. As the 
court explained in Pryzbowski v. u.s. Healthcare, Inc.,274 "a holding 
that Pryzbowski's claims against u.s. Healthcare are not completely 
preempted would open the door for legal challenges to core managed 
care practices (e.g., the policy of favoring in-network specialists over 
out-of-network specialists), which the Supreme Court eschewed in 
Pegram.'.275 Moreover, keeping liability to a minimum for 
employing cost-containment strategies ultimately keeps the costs of 
health insurance down, so that presumably, more individuals can 
have access to health care. 
Another benefit to the current policy is that traditional liability 
rules carry the weight of consistency. They are premised on many 
fundamental principles of medical ethics, which we believe to be 
important, such as physician loyalty to the patient. The public, by 
and large, is comfortable with these rules. Moreover, current liability 
rules play an important role in encouraging physicians to deliver 
quality care and providing a remedy to patients when physicians do 
not deliver such care .. Therefore, it is important to stress that it is not 
the system of rules providing for physician liability that is flawed, but 
272. DONALD H. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 18 (Clarendon Press 1980). 
273. Id. at 83. 
274. 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001). 
275. Id. at 274-75. 
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rather, the rules' specific fonnulation and implementation through the 
standard of care. Therefore, the current standard of care, defined by 
the medical profession and imposed by the law, is ethically troubling 
from a rule utilitarian perspective. 
Despite the benefits described above, the costs of the policy on 
physician liability have become too great. Commentators may argue 
that principles of act utilitarianism,. among other things, justify 
physicians' actions with respect to health care delivery. That is, by 
committing themselves to maximizing health care outcomes for each 
individual patient, physicians might assert that the delivery of health 
care with little regard to overall cost nevertheless maximizes utility. 
Physicians' fiduciary and ethical duties, which require the patients' 
needs to be put first, .buttresses this moral justification. Also, the fact 
that it is difficult to assess the impact on others of this "patient first" 
practice strengthens the argument. Therefore, one might assert that 
the negative utility of such a system is too speculative compared to 
the benefits of the prevailing health care delivery system. Yet, while. 
we cannot specifically state that ignoring costs for one patient leads 
to less treatment for another, the overall impact of such actions is 
clear--escalating health care costs, which generally threatens the 
health care system. An act utilitarian justification is really illusory, 
and the costs of the policy far outweigh the benefits. 
At first glance, this conclusion might seem intuitively incorrect. It 
may appear that summing up positive health care outcomes produces 
the greatest overall health care consequences. However, if physicians 
work to maximize individual health. care outcomes in any given 
medical situation, regardless of societal costs, we do not achieve the 
best possible overall health care results. Such a system ultimately 
cannot be sustained. 276 Requiring physicians to provide all 
potentially beneficial care to individuals without considering overall 
societal costs is problematic because such a system does not 
necessarily produce a better individual health care outcome.277 The 
marginal utility of additional costly treatments, tests, procedures, and 
276. See HALL, supra note 5, at 117. 
277. See id. at 131. 
2003] PHYSICIAN LIABILITY AND MANAGED CARE 685 
office VISItS for a given patient is often very low. Incorporating 
sensible cost considerations into the treatment decision often does not 
in any way diminish individual health care outcomes. 
"Because physicians play such an integral role in health care 
delivery, cost containment is impossible unless they make it an 
.essential factor in their decision making.'.278 The current policy 
undermines this effort by subjecting physicians to liability for 
rationing care as a way to control costS?79 Because physicians face 
such liability, they will not and do not fully embrace cost containment 
efforts. 
For. instance, recent studies have documented that physicians will, 
and often do, lie for their patients to obtain what physicians believe to 
be necessary care.280 Indeed, studies have documented that this 
"gaming the system," as physicians often call it, is more prevalent 
under managed health care.281 Because physicians do not see 
themselves as on the same team with MeOs in cutting health care 
costs, and because physicians feel an ethical and legal obligation to 
provide care, they will often engage in deception, for example, by 
exaggerating a diagnosis to obtain authorization and coverage for a 
recommended treatment.282 A recent study found sanctioning of 
deception occurred more frequently in markets with higher managed 
care penetration?83 An overwhelming majority of physicians studied 
indicated that they believed that, in many cases, deception was . 
consistent with their professional obligations, and that they in fact 
had to resort to deception to advance their patients' interests.284 In 
addition, it has long been documented that so-called "defensive 
medicine" is responsible for a significant amount of· health care 
costS.285 Although commentators dispute whether the figure is as 
278. Robert I. Herrington, Herdrich v. Pegram: ERISA Fiduciary Liability and Physician Incentives 
to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 716 (2000). 
279. Id. at 719-20. 
280. See Victor G. Freeman, et al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 
159 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2263 (1999). 
281. Id. at 2263. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 2267. 
285. See MENZEL, supra note 49, at 152. 
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high as the fifty-two billion dollars estimated by the American 
Medical Association, "[l]iability suits have undoubtedly constituted a 
cost-escalating pressure in medicine.,,286 
Additionally, the current policy has significant costs because it 
creates an adversarial relationship between MCOs and physicians, 
and to some extent physicians and their patients. Therefore, not only 
is current liability policy failing to produce and maximize overall 
positive health care outcomes, it is also in many cases failing to 
produce even positive individual health-care outcomes. For example, 
the problem of tenninating physicians from plans because of over-
utilization or advocating for patients breaks up the continuity of 
physician-patient relationships?87 These points have been 
highlighted in the literature discussing the effects of managed care, 
and therefore will not be discussed here. However, it is important to 
note that the policy problem has had negative effects not just on 
physicians, but on patients as well. 
Physician liability rules, instead of maximizing utility, in fact 
undennine society's overall goal of lowering health-care costs, and 
therefore the rules fail to produce the greatest overall health care 
"good.,,288 Therefore, changing these rules is necessary and ethically 
justified, and must be done in such a way that guides physicians 
toward reaching the best overall result, even if it sometimes produces 
a less than optimal outcome in individual cases. The rules must be 
structured so that physicians no longer feel compelled by law and 
their "patient first" ethics to maximize their individual patients' 
health outcomes at the expense of society's goal of controlling health 
care costS.289 
N. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
There are several potential solutions to the policy problem. First, 
proponents of the status quo believe that physicians must operate 
286. See id. at 151. 
287. See Liner. supra note 218. at 518; Little. supra note 20. at 1402. 
288. See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1842. 
289. See id. at 1842. 
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under the same standards and requirements as they always have 
because any changes to account for the effects of managed care 
would be detrimental to patients. Second, there are proposals for 
greater MCO liability by removing ERISA immunity. A third 
solution envisions targeted legislation to control the negative effects 
of managed care. Finally, a fourth potential solution proposes 
changing the malpractice standard to allow for considerations of cost. 
A. Maintain the Current Standard of Care 
One approach to the policy problem is to leave in place the 
"patient-interest oriented" standard of care, and instead find ways to 
consider costs outside the physician-patient relationship.290 
Commentators argue that cost considerations should be brought into 
health care through explicit rationing mechanisms that work outside 
the physician-patient relationship.291 The foundation of this 
argument is that changing the standard of care to incorporate cost 
considerations would' "dramatically alter the fiduciary nature of the 
physician-patient relationship," and such an alteration should be 
avoided at all costS.292 
Maintaining the current standard of care is an attractive solution 
because it appeals to notions of absolute physician fidelity. 293 This 
approach has long been the driving ethical justification of the model 
physician-patient relationship and, therefore, as a policy solution it 
has the appeal of continuity and the support of intuition. Yet this 
approach is problematic for several reasons. First, it centers on 
preserving the so-called sanctity of the physician-patient relationship. 
Though the fiduciary nature of the relationship is important, it is 
equally important to keep in mind the extent of the fiduciary duty. 
Proponents of the current standard of care argue that changing the 
. standard would essentially give the physician "permission to consider 
matters that [are] not necessarily in the patient's interest when 
290. See id. at 1845-46. 
291. See id. at 1846. 
292. [d. at 1844. 
293. See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1844. 
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evaluating a course of treatment.,,294 They assert that, by considering 
cost, the physician "might even be required or allowed to recommend 
a course of care that [is] not optimal.,,295 Yet this argument for 
avoiding any consideration of cost takes an unrealistic view of the 
physician-patient relationship. The ideal of the physician-patient 
relationship has been exaggerated; the potential has long been present 
for the phySician to take action that might not be in the best interests 
of the patient, for example, by recommending too much care because 
it was in the physicians' economic interest to do SO.296 
Second, proponents of maintaining the standard of care argue that 
changing the standard to accommodate society's interest in 
controlling costs would be difficult and problematic because it is not 
clear how to take such considerations into account in a "consistent 
and equitable manner.,,297 Though bringing cost into the treatment 
relationship would not be· easy, this objection is not a reason to 
maintain the status quo. Applying the current standard of care in a 
"consistent and equitable manner" has proven problematic as 
physicians take many different approaches to treating similar 
illnesses, with variances based on little more than the geographic 
location of the physician and patient. There is no reason to think that 
clinical-practice guidelines, supported by the government, and 
modifications to medical education could not do as good a job, if not 
better, at maintaining consistency in approaches to treating illness. 
Also problematic is the assumption that explicit rationing 
mechanisms can accomplish cost-containment with the current 
standard of care. First, such an approach likely would not work 
because it would encourage physicians to manipulate the system to 
secure resources for patients. By leaving physicians off of the cost-
containment team, explicit rationing would therefore have little 
legitimacy and staying power. Indeed, such an approach would likely 
breed the same hostility among physicians that managed care has, 
with physicians seeing themselves as warriors for patients in the fight 
294. [d. 
295. [d. 
296. WONG, supra note 14, at 65. 
297. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1844. 
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against the forces that seek to control costS.298 Moreover, explicit 
rationing based on government or third-party guidelines would leave 
little room for the uniqueness of individual cases.299 
In summary, the status quo approach is problematic because it 
perpetuates both unfairness to physicians and the old thinking shared 
by patients and the medical community that physicians should not 
consider costs in the treatment decision. This approach raises 
significant utilitarian concerns. 
B. Targeted Legislation 
Another possible solution to the policy problem is for the federal 
government or states to p~ss targeted legislation. Indeed, many states 
have attempted initiatives aimed at minimizing unfairness to 
physicians and protecting the physician-patient relationship. While 
these reforms can, in some instances, be helpful, they are not the best 
solution to the policy problem. 
Numerous pieces of targeted legislation focus on aspects of the 
policy problem. For instance, California has a statute, similar to 
those in other states,300 that aims to "provide protection against 
retaliation for physicians who advocate for medically appropriate 
health care for their patients.,,301 The statute provides: 
The application and rendering by any person of a decision to 
terminate an employment or other contractual relationship with, 
or otherwise penalize, a physician and surgeon principally for 
advocating for medically appropriate health care consistent with 
that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by 
reputable legal physicians practicing according to the applicable 
standard of care violates the public policy of this state. No 
person shall terminate, retaliate against, or otherwise penalize a 
physician and surgeon for that advocacy, nor shall any person 
298. See Field. supra note 1. at 481-82. 
299. See Hirshfeld. supra note 2. at 1845. 
300. See. e.g., 215 Iu... CaMP. STAT. ANN. 134-35 (West 2(01); PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2113 (2000). 
301. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West 2(01). 
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prohibit, restrict, or in any way discourage a physician and 
surgeon from communicating to a patient information in 
furtherance of medically appropriate health care.302 
Other examples of targeted managed care legislation exist on the 
federal level. For example, in 1996, Congress passed the Newborns' 
and Mothers' Health Care Protection Act303 in response to public 
concern over so-called "drive-through deliveries" whereby health 
plans required hospitals to discharge mothers and newborns from the 
hospital, assuming no major health complications existed, within 
twenty-four hours after delivery. The legislation required all health 
plans to provide coverage for a minimum forty-eight hour hospital 
stay. Other bills have required health plans to cover specialized 
women's health services such as minimum hospital stays for 
mastectomies and lumpectomies,304 annual mammograms for women 
over forty, and certain gynecological services.305 
Targeted federal and state initiatives, while in some cases helpful, 
do not address the full policy problem. Indeed, such initiatives, 
assuming they are not preempted by ERISA, can create additional 
problems that ultimately undermine the central goal of the drive to 
reform health care-lowering costs. "Consumer protection against 
managed care is particularly subject to 'mom-and-apple-pie' rhetoric 
and legislative posturing.,,306 This posturing can lead to 
"misdirected" legislative initiatives in that, "[e]ven when the 
legislature successfully identifies a real problem, the issue is 
invariably more complex than it first appears, and the proposed 
reforms suffer from their own shortcomings, even without factoring 
in the (usually carefully ignored) economic implications.,,307 
There are many examples of this problem. First, statutes like the 
one In California, while providing some protection for physicians 
302. [d. 
303. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185). 
304. Breast Cancer Patient Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 536, 107th Congo (2001); Women's Cancer 
Recovery Act of 2001, H.R. 1485, 107th Congo (2001). 
305. Mammogram Availability Act of 1997, H.R. 617, S. 727, 105th Congo (1997). 
306. Hyman, supra note 122, at 303. 
307. [d. at 303-04. 
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against retaliation, do so imperfectly. It is often difficult to show the 
real reason why a physician was terminated from a plan.308 In 
addition, such statutes would ultimately increase litigation by 
physicians against health plans. Although the litigation may be well-
founded, it would almost certainly drive up the cost of health care by 
creating additional costs for health plans. 
In addition, piecemeal legislation does nothing to get the physician 
involved in cutting the costs of health care. The assumption 
underlying many such legislative initiatives is that physicians should 
practice medicine like they did in the fee-for-service days, putting 
individual patients first and advocating for all treatment that is within 
the current standard of care. The standard of care does not include 
considerations of cost. Therefore, while providing some measure of 
relief for physicians, on its own, targeted legislation likely would do 
little to encourage a reduction in health care costs. This problem 
makes such legislation weak from a utilitarian perspective because it 
could do more overall harm than good. 
C. Provide for Direct MeO Liability 
A third possible solution to the policy problem is federal 
legislation either to amend ERISA or, standing on its own, to give 
patients a direct right to sue their MCOs for injury caused when cost-
containment decisions may have contributed to a poor patient 
outcome. Numerous lawmakers and commentators advocate this 
approach. Recently there have been several "Patients Bill of Rights" 
proposals in Congress.309 Such proposals would not only give 
patients a right to sue their MCOs, but would also guarantee a right to 
direct access to certain specialists such as obstetricians, gynecologists 
and pediatricians. They would also require MCOs to have an 
external appeals process in place if a patient wanted to challenge a 
coverage decision.310 In addition to legislative initiatives to give 
patients a direct right to sue MCOs, some courts recently have shown 
308. Liner. supra note 218. at 517. 
309. See Hyman, supra note 122. at 289. 
310. See id. at 291-92. 
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a willingness to limit the ERISA preemption shield that MeOs have 
enjoyed.311 
The court in Andrews-Clarke summarized the benefits of imposing 
direct liability on MeOs. The court criticized piecemeal approaches 
to managed care regulation and stated that instead of attempting to 
regulate managed health care procedure-by-procedure, "the more 
efficient approach is to allow insurers and utilization review 
providers to make benefit determinations on a case-by-case basis, but 
hold them legally accountable for the consequences of their 
decisions.,,312 The court in that case and others have noted that, by 
holding MeOs directly accountable, unwarranted cost-cutting in the 
utilization review process will not be cost-free to the MeO, and 
therefore MeOs will have greater incentives to ensure high-quality 
services as well as lower costS.313 
This solution to the policy problem is attractive in that it would 
mitigate at least some of the unfairness that currently results from 
making physicians primarily liable for cost-cutting treatment 
decisions. Such an approach is intuitively and legally appealing 
because MeOs would be subject to liability and therefore 
accountable for their actions. Enacted on the federal level, such a 
right would apply to all MeO subscribers and would therefore have 
the appeal of uniformity of a remedy for those who allege injury, as 
well as uniformity of requirements and legal precedent for the MeOs 
who would be subject to liability. Despite the apparent benefits of 
this proposal, however, it is not the solution that would produce the 
overall best outcome for health care. 
Although guaranteeing patients a right to sue their health plans is 
politically popular, it is clear even to proponents of the legislation 
that such a right will increase the costs of health insurance. 
Similarly, recent cases denying ERISA preemption and allowing 
claims to go forward against MeOs involve significant costs. The 
cost to litigate such complex lawsuits will ultimately get passed on to 
311. See. e.g .• Cristantielli v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1063 (N.D. Tex. 
2(00). 
312. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (emphasis in original). 
313. [d. at 63. 
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health insurance subscribers.314 These cost increases likely will lead 
to a growing number of uninsured individuals.315 Furthermore, such 
initiatives, standing alone, do little to change the perception that 
rationing care is wrong and that cost should not be a component of 
the treatment decision. While it helps physicians and MCOs to share 
more fully the liability burdens of cost containment, it does little to 
encourage individual physicians and the medical profession to do 
more to contain health care costs. To some extent, such a proposal is 
ultimately premised on the theory that physicians should practice 
medicine the way they did in the fee-for-service days. The direct 
liability proposal, therefore, suffers from important utilitarian flaws. 
Accordingly, though such a proposal is not inconsistent with an ideal 
policy response, standing alone it does not do enough. 
A fourth proposal is to modify the malpractice standard applied to 
physicians. As explained below, this solution, in conjunction with 
legislation aimed at protecting physicians from the unfairness of the 
current scheme, is the most promising for several reasons. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION - REFORM THROUGH THE MEDICAL 
PROFESSION 
The best overall solution to the policy problem is for the medical 
profession to take the initiative and institute reforms in the way they 
practice medicine such that they responsibly and effectively 
incorporate considerations of cost into the treatment decision. By 
doing this, the medical profession can gradually modify the legal 
standard of care can so that a physician no longer faces or fears 
liability if she does not do "everything" for a patient regardless of 
cost. This approach does not require lowering the standard of care, 
but rather makes the standard of care more reflective of the current 
state of health care and matches the goals of health-care reform. 
Additionally, a modified standard of care would work with targeted 
314. See Hyman, supra note 122, at 304. 
315. See id. Indeed, we are currently seeing the effects of increases in malpractice insurance as a 
result of increased malpractice litigation and awards-physicians are leaving their practices because 
they cannot afford the premiums. 
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legislation to guarantee physicians fair treatment in their relationships 
with MCOs, yet still encourage utility-maximizing practice styles. 
While physicians would still face liability for treating a patient in a 
manner that does not comport with acceptable medical practice, the 
law would no longer pretend that costs should not be considered in 
the treatment decision. 
A. Policy Change Through the Profession 
As discussed above, traditional ethical and legal requirements that 
the physician put the individual patient first can no longer stand.316 
As an ethical matter, such policies have the effect of being 
fundamentally unfair to physicians and, from a utilitarian perspective, 
the costs far outweigh the benefits. Therefore, while it is clear that 
physicians should not completely discard fiduciary duties to patients, 
it is equally clear that the medical profession must alter its way of 
doing business-no longer rejecting the notion of any type of bedside 
rationing.317 Although the medical culture surely cannot change 
overnight, the profession can take concrete steps to effect a solution 
to the policy problem outlined above. The first and most important 
step is to begin altering the traditional meaning of the standard of 
care. 
The traditional notion of the standard of care rests on "patient first" 
principles. While maintaining a standard that demands quality 
medical treatment is important, this standard must no longer naively 
require physician fidelity to the individual patient without any regard 
to costs. Striking such a balance may seem difficult, but such a 
solution is not out of reach. There are two possible options to 
effectuate a change in the standard of care. The first is to pass 
legislation that would incorporate cost into the standard of care?18 
The broad principles that underlie the standard of care could change 
to focus less on the individual patient, and instead provide that "care 
would not be deemed necessary unless it had a high probability of 
316. See MORREIM, supra note 15, at 86. 
317. See id. 
318. See Hirshfeld, supra note 2, at 1842. 
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resulting in a substantial benefit to the patient.,,319 Legislation could 
require physicians to balance a duty to society to control health-care 
costs against the duty to the individual patient.32o Finally, a 
legislatively-created defense to a malpractice action could protect a 
physician who treats a patient where there are insufficient resources 
available to finance the recommended treatment.321 The second 
option is to allow the standard to evolve in the courtS.322 This option 
implies some evolution within the medical profession itself as the 
standard of care is derived from the prevailing views of appropriate 
practice by physicians themselves. 323 
Putting the burden on and giving the power· to the medical 
profession to address the policy problem makes sense for several 
reasons. As an initial matter, an argument can be made that 
physicians have a duty to participate in lowering the costs of health 
care. This duty stems from the fact that the escalating costs of health 
care in some measure are the result of the autonomy physicians have 
enjoyed over the past several decades and the influence physicians 
have had over the structure of health insurance and reimbursement. 324 
Because physicians have, arguably, reaped substantial benefits from 
the fee-for-service system, one could assert that they now must bear 
some of the burdens of working toward a solution. 
A second reason supporting a solution generated by the medical 
profession is that, while recognizing that physicians have a duty to 
work toward a solution, it also respects physicians' autonomy and 
professional status. One of the main objections by physicians to 
managed health care is that it erodes their autonomy with respect to 
clinical matters. Leaving physicians to appropriately modify the 
standard of care empowers them and moves their status from being 
part of the problem to part of the solution. The profession will thus 
"buy in" to the policy solution in a way that, clearly, they have not 
319. [d. 
320. See id. 1842-43. 
321. See id. 
322. See id. 
323. Hirshfeld. supra note 2, at 1845. 
324. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 332 (Basic Books 1982). 
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done with the externally-imposed rules of the government and 
MCOs. This buy-in is important because physicians who feel that 
third parties are inappropriately affecting their clinical decision 
making may resort to deception to provide the care they think is in 
their patients' best interests; they feel ethically and legally justified in 
doing so. As discussed above, this "act utilitarianism" serves to 
subvert the goals of health care cost containment and has significant 
"rule" utilitarian effects. 
Similarly, it is important to respect the profession and allow it to 
redefine the goals of medical practice. These goals should not be 
externally imposed, but should come from within, and can be a part 
of a larger rethinking of the accepted aims of medical practice. As 
stated by an international committee studying health-care reform, 
"unless such an examination is carried out, and some new and better 
ideals and directions formulated, the enterprise of medicine and the 
health care systems of which it is a part will be . .. economically 
unsustainable.,,325 One way to bridge the gap between the actions of 
individual physicians on behalf of individual patients and the effects 
on society is to empower physicians so they can make the necessary 
changes to their pattern of practicing medicine. 
Additionally, leaving the medical profession to modify the 
standard of care is preferable because physicians are in the best 
position to know what care is cost-effective and provides marginal 
benefits in any given clinical situation. Moreover, because of their 
specialized training, physicians can most effectively study and 
evaluate treatments for cost-effectiveness and determine whether a 
particular treatment is justified given its costs and expected benefits. 
B. Modification Through Clinical Practice Guidelines 
Once it is accepted that the medical profession is in the best 
position to bring about a policy change to alleviate the effects of the 
policy problem, the question becomes whether the profession in fact 
has the tools to do so. Courts have long recognized that they do. 
325. THE GoALS OF MEDICINE: THE FORGOITEN IsSUE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 12 (Mark J. 
Hanson & Daniel Callahan eds., Georgetown University Press 1999). 
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Courts defer to the medical profession to determine the appropriate 
standard of care in .medical malpractice cases.326 The standard 
traditionally has been gleaned from a variety of sources, including 
professional journals and conferences, as well as the "complex 
interaction" of the members of the medical profession.327 Over time, 
the opinions and comments of members of the profession, if 
accepted, grow into a "clinical policy," and then the standard of 
care.328 For any given medical problem, there is not merely one 
correct standard of care.329 Variations exist, and courts allow juries 
to determine precisely which standard of those presented at trial 
should govern in any particular case.330 Cost can begin to become 
part of the standard of care; one of the methods for incorporating 
sensible cost considerations into the standard is through clinical 
practice guidelines.331 
Simply stated, clinical practice guidelines, also referred to as 
critical pathways, clinical practice protocols, and practice parameters, 
are "sets of suggestions, described in decision rules, based on current 
medical consensus about how to treat a certain illness or 
condition.,,332 Such guidelines are meant to assist both the physician 
and patient in making decisions about appropriate care in specific 
ciicumstances.333 Clinical practice guidelines have attracted attention 
not just as a quality and cost control device, but also as a tool for 
defining the appropriate standard of care in a malpractice case: 
326. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Memitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1992). 
327. Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should They Constitute Conclusive 
Evidence of the Standard of Care?, 1 0 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 77 (2000). 
328. /d. 
329. Id. at 78. 
330. Barry R. Furrow, Imposing liability for the Undenreatment of Pain by Physicians, Hospitals, 
Nursing Homes, and Managed Care Organizations, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28 (2001). 
331. Id. at 32. This paper does not discuss the technical legal issues involving the weight, in a given 
malpractice case, to be given to clinical practice guidelines, whether such guidelines should be 
conclusive of the standard of care, and other related issues. This article assumes that such guidelines 
would, at a minimum, be considered in determining the standard of care. See Arnold J. Rosoff, The 
Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Refonn, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 390-91 (1995). 
332. Furrow, supra note 330, at 32. 
333. Finder, supra note 327, at 70. 
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The development and proliferation of clinical practice guidelines 
has speeded the process by which good evidence-based medical 
practice becomes recognized and disseminated as such. In 
response to the rapid growth in medical research and published 
findings, these guidelines have become one of the transforming 
forces in current medical practice.,,334 
The medical profession has "expended substantial effort" on 
developing practice guidelines, many of which have been produced 
by medical specialty societies and individual medical centers.335 In 
the last ten years, the federal government has also sponsored efforts 
to develop clinical practice guidelines through the Agency for 
Healthcare Policy and Research (now known as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, "AHRQ,,).336 Between 1992 and 
1996, the agency sponsored the development of nineteen clinical 
practice guidelines.337 AHRQ maintains the National Guideline 
Clearinghouse, which is a free, publicly available database of clinical 
practice guidelines, produced in partnership with the American 
Medical Association and the American Association of Health Plans. 
"[T]he fact that they are· produced by national medical specialty 
societies and the government means that they will be influential.,,338 
Although critics label clinical practice guidelines as "cookbook" 
medicine,339 in fact, studies have shown that they can be effective in 
both improving health care quality and cutting costs. Studies have 
also demonstrated that physicians, when properly trained in the use of 
such guidelines and when audited for compliance, follow the 
guidelines and believe they can be helpful. 340 Moreover, physicians 
can use clinical practice guidelines to educate patients and involve 
them in the effort to make sensible health care choices. Indeed, 
334. Furrow, supra note 330, at 35. 
335. [d. at 32, 35. 
336. AHRQ Profile, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/aboutlprofile.htm. 
337. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: Clinical Practice Guidelines Online, available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm. 
338. Furrow, supra note 330, at 32. 
339. Glenn Flores et aI., Pediatricians' Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices Regarding Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: A National Survey, 105 PEDIATRICS No.3, 500 (Mar. 2000). 
340. [d. 
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patients rights advocates view guidelines as a means of improving 
patient autonomy, made easier because the guidelines are available 
online.341 
In a study published in the Journal of the American College of 
Surgeons, researchers stated that, if adopted and practiced, clinical 
practice guidelines "can improve performance and lower the cost of 
health care by reducing provider variability and error and controlling 
geographic practice patterns. [Clinical practice guidelines] have been 
demonstrated to be effective in lowering costs and improving 
outcomes in several surgical, medical, trauma, and ICU settings.,,342 
Despite these results, the researchers found that variations in clinical 
practice may still exist, in part due to the fact that, at many medical 
centers, treatment orders are delegated to "junior members" of the 
medical team who may order treatment that exceeds the requirements 
of the guidelines. out of inexperience. 343 Likewise, more senior 
physicians might over treat "out of rote.,,344 With respect to both the 
less experienced physicians and the more senior physicians on staff, 
the researchers found that a system that simply reminds physicians of 
the guidelines and then audits for compliance yields a significantly 
higher incidence of compliance with, and benefit from, the 
guidelines.345 In the study, compliance with the guidelines was 48% 
before the institution of continuous surveillance by a nurse who was 
trained as a clinical resource manager.346 Compliance was 74% after 
surveillance was instituted, with all deviations from the guidelines 
deemed to be medically justified. 347 
The researchers noted that for the two conditions studied, over a 
two month period, the cost of "over" treatment due to noncompliance 
with the guidelines was $22,760.35. The researchers concluded that, 
with proper oversight, there was "a significant preliminary potential 
341. See Finder, supra note 327, at 71; Furrow, supra note 330, at 33. 
342. Heidi L. Frankel et al., Strategies to Improve Compliance with Evidence-Based Clinical 
Management Guidelines, 189 I. AM. SURG. 533 (1999). . 
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for cost savings" with clinical management guidelines. 348 Indeed, 
specific estimates found in the guidelines themselves support this 
conclusion. For instance, in a clinical practice guideline dealing with 
the treatment of pressure ulcers, the authors explain that in economic 
terms, the reported cost of pressure ulcer treatment can vary greatly. 
The guideline estimates that the total national cost of pressure ulcer 
treatment exceeds $1.335 billion. Implementation of the 
recommendations is estimated to reduce the cost of pressure ulcer 
treatment by 3% or $40 million?49 
Through the use of clinical practice guidelines, cost considerations 
can become a legitimate component of the standard of care for 
several reasons. First, the guidelines will help minimize wasteful or 
unnecessary care as well as treatment variations based on little more 
than geographic location of the physician and patient. Second, the 
guidelines will alert physicians to treatment patterns that are most 
cost-effective or that represent the greatest cost benefit in any given 
situation. With appropriate institutional and professional oversight 
and incorporation into medical education, physicians can therefore 
learn to practice more cost-effective medicine, and do so in a way 
that avoids haphazard, forced rationing. 
Finally, making cost a legitimate component of the treatment 
decision will serve to lessen the chance that an MCO would deselect 
or terminate a physician from a plan for practicing medicine in too 
costly a manner. To the extent MCOs still threatened termination or 
imposed unreasonable cost limitations, targeted legislation like that 
discussed above would work hand-in-hand with a new standard of 
care to protect the physician while encouraging more cost-efficient 
medical practice. 
Critics may argue that the proposal to change the governing 
standard of care to allow for considerations of cost in the treatment 
decision sanctions bedside rationing. Critics point out that such 
rationing is not legitimate because it places physicians in an ethical 
348. [d. at 537. 
349. Pressure Ulcer Clinical Practice Guideline. available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm. 
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dilemma-pitting patient needs against treatment costS.350 They 
argue that rationing must move away from the bedside and into 
public view as part of the democratic process.351 In this way, 
rationing choices are open to debate, and physicians can establish 
clear guidelines.352 Such guidelines would free the physician from 
having to make these choices and would involve individual patients· 
in making the difficult decisions.353 Moreover, critics argue that 
bedside rationing can be haphazard and even discriminatory.354 
Yet under the policy solution advocated here, bedside rationing 
need not be as ethically deficient as critics argue. First, despite the 
fear that such rationing will pit physicians against patients and erode 
the trust patients have in their physicians, this is not necessarily the 
case. Physicians are still "one of the most highly trusted professional 
groupS.,,355 Indeed, when faced with the fact that rationing in some 
way must be a part of modem health care, most patients would prefer 
that their physician, whom they trust, do the rationing, as opposed to 
MCOs or government organizations.356 Additionally, some such 
rationing already takes place in health c~e?57 Giving it a scientific 
basis and bringing it out into the open will likely lend the practice 
credibility and ultimately serve to enhance the trust already present in 
the physician-patient relationship.358 
Second, such rationing decisions, although made at the bedside, 
would be more open than they are today. Changes to the standard of 
care would require changes within the medical community, beginning 
with the way we educate physicians. Physicians would have an 
opportunity to participate in crafting suggested practice guidelines 
and could then discuss openly with their patients the efficacy of 
treatments in light of their cost. With the availability and usefulness 
350. See UBEL, supra note 46, at 137. 
351. See WONG, supra note 14, at 45. 
352. See id. 
353. See id. 
354. See UBEL, supra note 46, at 139-41. 
355. [d. at 139. 
356. [d. at 140. 
357. [d. at 140. 
358. See WONG, supra note 14, at 45. 
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of clinical practice guidelines in educating and informing patients, 
bedside rationing need not be a secretive, illegitimate practice as it 
traditionally has been viewed. Additionally, bedside rationing, under 
the solution envisioned here, would not be as haphazard or 
discriminatory as imagined. Through the use of clinical practice 
guidelines, with appropriate oversight as necessary, physicians would 
achieve bedside rationing in an even-handed and more scientifically-
supported way. Moreover, a broadening of the standard of care to 
encompass cost considerations, with the use of practice guidelines, 
would best succeed if the principles were a part of medical education 
and training. Therefore, once they reached practice, physicians would 
be properly equipped to make responsible bedside rationing 
decisions. Bedside rationing has two moral strengths.359 It is 
"indispensable" in that reducing the costs of health care cannot be 
achieved without the efforts of physicians, and it allows health care to 
be rationed in a way that accounts for individual patient needs in 
unique clinical settings. 360 
Finally, some sanctioning of bedside rationing and modification of 
the standard of care need not and should not mean the elimination of 
all liability for physicians, nor must it weaken important ethical 
duties with which we are comfortable. It is possible to preserve some 
of the most important benefits of the current liability framework 
while mitigating its unfairness and minimizing the costs. Because 
modifying the current standard of care leaves in place traditional 
liability principles, the solution proposed here provides a realistic and 
more incremental approach to resolving the policy problem. 
CONCLUSION 
As explained above, the policy problem is one with deep roots in 
our legal, medical, and popular culture. Its ethical complexity 
illustrates that a simple, politically popular legislative fix, whether in 
the form of targeted state or federal legislation or a "Patients Bill of 
359. Id. 
360. UBEL, supra note 46, at 147. 
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Rights," may be necessary, but not enough, for an optimal solution. 
The optimal solution must include an initiative from the medical 
profession to responsibly embrace cost considerations that temper the 
"patient first" ethic with utility-maximizing practice patterns. A new 
standard of care coupled with state or federal legislation that protects 
the physician from the unfairness of the current policy (such as 
legislation preventing termination from an MCO where the MCO's 
cost-containment goals exceed a new, cost-conscious standard of 
care) can go a long way toward solving the policy problem. In this 
way, legislation that might otherwise have perpetuated the cost-
escalating style of medical practice can work hand-in-hand with the 
medical profession to produce the cultural changes that health care 
desperately needs. 
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